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ABSTRACT
Democratic citizen orientation – support for democratic principles and values –
appears an important ingredient in making democracies work. However, there is no
agreement as to what attitudes and behaviors make up a democratic citizen orientation.
The main goals of this dissertation are to: (1) identify and describe factors that
characterize adolescents’ democratic orientation, (2) explore cross-cultural variation in
democratic orientations among adolescents in established and aspiring democracies, (3)
investigate the relationship between adolescents’ democratic orientations and historical
legacies of their countries, (4) investigate the relationship between adolescents’
democratic orientations and the current quality of democratic institutions, and (5) analyze
the implications of democratic orientations among adolescents for their expected
involvement in future political and social activities.
This dissertation addresses these goals through quantitative analyses of data from
the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS, 2009) and the Quality of
Democracy Index (2008-2009). Results from this dissertation reveal that democratic
orientation does not form a homogenous democratic mindset. Rather, a pro-democratic
orientation contains a multidimensional pattern of democratic attitudes, with three
distinct aspects consistently present in all analyzed societies. Analyses of the role of
historic legacies show that in their democratic orientations, adolescents are still largely
influenced by previous regimes of their respective societies. Thus, it was found that
countries with a history of democratic traditions tend to have a higher proportion of
democratically-oriented adolescents in comparison with countries with a history of
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communism. However, the results are mixed in terms of specific factors that compose
adolescents’ democratic orientation. On average, students in countries with a history of
democratic tradition show a greater endorsement of civil liberties values than students
from countries with a history of communism. Similarly, higher trust levels are observed
among adolescents in established democracies than among their peers in aspiring
democracies. At the same time, when compared with adolescents in established
democracies, students from aspiring democracies are more likely to have higher scores on
the measure of engagement potential.
Additional results show a strong relationship between adolescents’ democratic
orientation and the quality of democratic institutions in their countries. Specifically, a
positive relationship was established between the quality of democratic institutions and
adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties values and trust levels. Alternatively, a
negative association was documented between adolescents’ engagement potential and the
quality of democratic institutions. Comparisons of the relative contributions of historical
legacy and the quality of democratic orientations produced mixed results. Although
historical legacy was found to be more important in determining the trust aspect of
adolescents’ democratic orientations, two other aspects, civil liberties and engagement
potential, were found to be influenced more by the quality of current democratic
institutions than by historical legacy. Finally, specific aspects of a democratic orientation
appear important factors in explaining variation in adolescents’ expectations for future
participation in social and political activities.
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Overall, this descriptive, comparative, and analytical study affirms the importance
of adolescents’ pro-democratic orientation for democratic prospects of individual
countries and whole regions. In addition, results support earlier claims that at the level of
public beliefs and orientations, democracy has taken root in most transitioning societies.
A better understanding of adolescents’ democratic orientations should help inform
policies that seek to promote a culture of democracy and respect for democratic values.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The Importance of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientations
The democratic outlook of young people in today’s societies is critical for
understanding and predicting developments in the political sphere as well as for
analyzing a broad array of issues in the larger social and cultural domains (Forbig, 2005;
Garbarino, 2011; Inglehart, 2003; Print, 2007; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, &
Schulz, 2001; Torney-Purta, Amadeo, & Pilotti, 2004). In the context of aspiring
democracies of Eastern and Central Europe, the question of democratic orientations
among adolescents gains additional importance as a new generation of post-communism
citizens is coming of age in societies that continue to tackle persisting challenges of the
transition period (Dimitrova-Grazl & Simon, 2010; Havel, 2007; Nikolayenko, 2008,
2011a, b). Many scholars, policymakers and other experts have expressed concerns with
regard to future democratization and consolidation of democratic institutions in
transitioning states and have pointed to the critical role young people play in these
processes. In a similar vein, scholars of democratic processes in advanced democracies
have long warned that negative trends in civic attitudes and behavior patterns among
youth have potentially negative implications for democracy (Dalton, 2004; Flanagan,
Levine, & Settersten, 2009; Settersten & Ray, 2010; Smith et al., 2011).
The survival, consolidation, and advancement of democracy in all states requires
the support of democratically oriented citizens, including younger generations. Learning
more about democratic attitudes among adolescents across different cultures has
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important implications for the fields of political science, developmental psychology, and
other disciplines (Hooghe, 2004). If we can find out more about political orientations of
young people, it would give us better insight into the future. As Franklin (2004) noted,
“The future lies in the hands of young people … because they are the ones who react to
new conditions” (p. 216).
Learning more about democratic orientation among adolescents is valuable not
only because it allows one to assess the level of readiness for democratic advancement in
the societies of interest, but also, and perhaps more importantly, because it provides
valuable insights into the worldview that shapes adolescents’ orientations towards others
within their communities and the larger society (Nikolayenko, 2008, 2011(a), 2011(c)).
Gaining a greater insight into adolescents’ democratic orientation, operationalized in this
research as a set of attitudes and behavioral patterns conducive to democracy, can help
one understand whether adolescents perceive themselves as full members of their
communities and whether they feel a sense of obligation to their communities and society
as a whole.
In addition, focusing on adolescents’ democratic orientation as a value in and of
itself is important from a children’s right perspective and is consistent with international
scholarship and advocacy that seek to advance the status of children (Alparone &
Rissotto, 2001; Freeman, 2007; Melton, 2005). A landmark phenomenon with regard to
policy and research on children’s issues has been the adoption of the 1989 United
Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) that established a comprehensive
framework for treating and protecting children. One of the most significant achievements
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of the Convention is that children have begun to be viewed as active participants of their
life situations, as opposed to mere recipients of adults’ protective efforts (Amna, Munk,
& Zetterberg, 2004; Benson, 2003; Hart & Mojica, 2006; Melton, 2006; Smith, 2009). In
a similar vein, a new emphasis on viewing children as resources to be developed rather
than problems to be solved has emerged (Roth & Brooks-Gunn, 2003). In light of
changes encouraged by interpretation and implementation of CRC principles, many
researchers have adopted a more complex, interactive approach that considers
adolescents as individuals with agency capable of independent thought and action
(Benson, 2003; Lerner, 2005; Sapiro, 2004). For example, Checkoway and colleagues
(2003) argued that adolescents are “competent citizens” who have the capacity and skills
to participate in matters relevant to their lives within the context of their communities.
Thus, taking into consideration the creation of new legal codes and the shift in
international norms for viewing children, the perspective of young people with regard to
democracy has important policy implications for implementing provisions of the CRC.
Finally, in the context of transitioning societies, learning about democratic
attitudes is instructive for adolescents and societies themselves. As Rose (2009) noted,
“For people living in a society that has been transformed, learning about change is more
than academic; it is a necessity” (p. 212). In discussing different aspects of democratic
transformation, an important role is given to children and young adults (Tomasik &
Silbereisen, 2012). On the one hand, some view underage population as being especially
vulnerable to the effects of transition (Lay & Torney-Purta, 2002; McAuley &
Macdonald, 2007). On the other hand, others believe that children and youth have a
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higher likelihood of benefiting from the transition than older generations (Agranovitch et
al., 2005; Finkel & Smith, 2011; Tomasik & Silbereisen, 2012). Although there are some
disagreements about the effects of transition on children, there is a growing recognition
that younger generations have the potential to contribute to the promotion of new
democratic values and norms and help bring their communities closer to the democratic
West (Blum, 2006; Brady, 2007; Cockburn, 2005; Demes & Forbig, 2007; Hart, 1997;
Levitskaya, n.d.).
Consequently, knowing more about adolescents’ democratic orientation might
inform policies and programs aimed at democracy promotion. Many policymakers
emphasize the importance of ordinary citizens in democracy promotion and have
advocated for a greater inclusion of youth in such efforts (Carothers, 2002; Marples,
2009). Some have argued that understanding and popularization of the concept of
democratic political culture among the general population is a key component in shaping
a prospective democratic outlook of transitioning countries (Stewart, 2009a, 2009b).
However, to help young people realize their potential to contribute to democratic survival
and advancement, it is first necessary to identify their democratic preferences.
Of note, children and youth of today’s transitioning states are among the first
generations who grew up with no direct experience of living under a totalitarian system
(Agranovitch et al., 2005; Nikolayenko, 2011a, 2011b). Because these new generations,
in the words of Vaclav Havel “are only now emerging into adulthood,” it is unclear to
what extent youths’ attitudes are shaped by new processes taking place in their
contemporary societies and to what degree deeper socio-cultural norms influence their
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democratic preferences and beliefs (Havel, 2007, p. 7). Thus, some have argued that
young people tend to embrace cultural and societal changes more easily than older
generations (Nikolayenko, 2008). At the same time, it is widely accepted that cultural
values and norms, rooted in history and traditions of all societies, are “slow-moving
institutions.” T, for example, adolescents might still be influenced by Soviet images that
are part of collective memory in post-communist societies (Dimitrova-Grajzl & Simon,
2010, p. 209).
In sum, examining the nature of young people’s democratic orientation might help
(a) describe the diverse range of democratic attitudes and behavioral patterns displayed
by adolescents in different countries, (b) examine links between countries’ democratic
record and adolescents’ democratic orientations, (c) reframe the research on
democratization in terms of inclusion of youth, and (d) identify future directions in the
development of societies in transition. In addition, analyses of the relationships between
countries’ historical legacies, current functioning of democratic institutions and young
people’s democratic orientations may help better describe the factors that influence
young people’s decisions to endorse democratic values and principles. This is why
investigating the specifics of youth attitudes towards democratic principles across
cultures is crucial both in terms of theoretical inquiries and practical implementation.
Hence, topics related to adolescents’ democratic orientation are worth researching.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Democratic Citizen Orientation
Many scholars of democracy, democratic transitions, and consolidation focus on
institutions and structures within society that are essential to democratic survival and
development (for example, Dahl, 1971, 1998; Dahl, Shapiro, & Cheibub, 2003; Diamond,
1997, 1999, 2011; Inglehart, 2000, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel, 2003). Generally, studies
that deal with elements of democratic society fall under one of the two broad categories.
One stems from a minimalist definition of democracy as a system of “government of the
people, by the people, for the people” and deals with formal institutions and mechanisms
through which democracy operates. Studies that fall under this category emphasize free
and fair elections, the rule of law, transparency, accountability, and other structures
within social and political domains that, when taken together, create an environment
favorable for democratic functioning (e.g., Huntington, 1991).
The other broad group of democratization studies singles out norms and behavior
patterns among ordinary citizens as key elements conducive to democratic advancement
(Almond & Verba, 1963; Huntington, 1993; Inglehart, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2003;
Lipset, 1994; Nikolayenko, 2011a, 2011c; Tessler & Gao, 2009). Supporters of this
position argue for a more expansive definition of democratic society that goes beyond its
basic elements and structures. Specifically, attitudes of the general public toward formal
structures of democracy along with individuals’ beliefs and behaviors are considered an
inseparable component of democratic society. Both classic and modern scholars of
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democracy emphasize the importance of public support for and endorsement of
democratic values. For example, De Tocqueville (1838 [2000]) considered democratic
values the foundation of civil society, and voluntary associations, the key to flourishing
democratic institutions. Nearly two centuries later Diamond (2008) wrote, “As a system
of government that requires the consent of the governed, democracy stands or falls with
citizen commitment to its norms and structures” (Introduction, p. x).
The importance of citizens’ values and beliefs for a country’s democratic
advancement was first empirically established by Almond and Verba (1963). They found
a strong link between democratization and attitudes and behaviors displayed by the
general public. Specifically, they claimed that, “… the development of a stable and
effective democratic government depends upon more than the structures of government
and politics: it depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process –
upon the political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 498). Easton (1965) further
analyzed how citizens’ adherence to democratic principles affect country’s democratic
functioning. In his seminal work on the role of citizens’ attitudes for democracy, he
established that public appreciation of democracy as a value in itself appears the main
condition that ensures democratic continuity across different periods of economic,
political or social hardships. In a similar vein, Patrick (1996) claimed that constitutional
democracy cannot be a “machine that would go off itself” (p. 4). Rather, he argued,
democracy can function properly only when there is a certain level of public
understanding about ideas of democracy and a widespread commitment to its ideals and
principles.
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Since then, a burgeoning body of literature has documented a number of
supportive habits and attitudes of the general population that are essential for survival and
development of democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963, 1980; Eckstein, 1998; Inglehart,
2000; Mattes, 2010; Norris, 1999; Tessler & Gao, 2009). Almond and Verba’s (1963)
work on the concept of civic culture laid the foundation for future inquiries into what
democracy researchers frequently refer to as democratic culture orientation and what in
this research is referred to as democratic citizen orientation. Almond was among the first
scholars to offer a systematic overview of individuals’ qualities and values that facilitate
democratic development. In his combination of components that matter for democracy,
he emphasized such elements as “informed, analytic, and rational” involvement of
citizens and their active role in the political and social life of society (p. 160).
Another prominent work on the role of citizens’ orientation for democratic
development is a study by Inglehart (1988). Inglehart introduced the notion of a
democratic political culture, defined broadly as a set of norms and behaviors that are
conducive to democratic development. Specifically, he singled out two components that
appeared important for sustainability and development of democratic institutions (a)
interpersonal trust and (b) long-term commitment to democratic institutions. According
to Inglehart, interpersonal trust appears a “prerequisite to the formation of secondary
associations,” and is essential for “the functioning of the democratic rules of the game”
(p. 1204). In his later research with Christian Welzel, he expanded these categories to
include the following attitudes and qualities of democratically-oriented public: tolerance
toward minority groups, interpersonal trust, a sense of well-being, political participation,
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and emphasis on postmaterialist values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; 2006). In his
subsequent works, Inglehart argued that the course of democratic survival and
development is determined by the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens. Additionally, he
emphasized the importance of democratically oriented citizenry for a country’s long-term
development by claiming that “political culture is a better predictor of the long-term
stability of democracy than it is of a society’s level of democracy at any given point in
time” (Inglehart, 2003, p. 53).
Tessler and Gao (2009) further explored the concept of a pro-democratic political
culture and the role of citizens’ values and behaviors in facilitating such a culture.
Specifically, they investigated how citizens in non-Western societies with different
histories and varying democratic institutions view elements of democratic political
culture. In examining the concept of democratic political culture, they focused on six
specific components: support for gender equality, tolerance, interpersonal trust, civic
participation, political interest, and political knowledge. Results revealed that although
distinct, these elements appeared interrelated and helped promote a democratic political
culture orientation among ordinary citizens. In concluding their research, Tessler and Gao
(2009) confirmed earlier findings about the significance of citizens’ democratic
orientations by noting that successful democratization depends not only on commitment
of government authorities to carry out democratic reforms but also on “the normative and
behavioral predispositions of ordinary citizens” (p. 197). Of note, Tessler and Gao’s
(2009) findings suggest that the relationship between democratic norms and the status of
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democracy exists not only in established democracies but that it can also be observed
among states that are moving toward democratic consolidation.
Dalton and Shin (2003) also studied democratic aspirations and endorsement of
democratic ideals by ordinary citizens as essential ingredients of a democratic society.
Specifically, they focused on public support for a democratic form of government and
beliefs that democracy is the most effective form of government. In their article
reviewing research on democratization and summarizing their work on political
implications of public support for democracy, Dalton and Shin concluded that:
The course of democratization, at least over the short term, is more likely to
depend on the strategic decisions of national elites than on the responses of
citizens to a public opinion survey. But in the long run, a democratic system
requires a democratic public to survive and function. (p. 20).
Other researchers have documented the connection between specific components
of a democratically-oriented citizenry and various aspects of sociopolitical reality. For
example, Gibson (1998) linked tolerance of outgroups with flourishing democracy and
argued that the former is an essential ingredient in any democratic society. Inglehart
(1999) believed that trust serves as a foundation for democracy and claimed that for a
democratic society to function, interpersonal trust among members of society is critical.
Similarly, Uslaner (2006) argued that trust is the key to better government, greater
economic growth, and more tolerance among members of the society. According to him,
more trusting societies have less corruption than societies with lower levels of trust. In
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turn, Fukuyama (1995, 2000) claimed that the level of trust among the members of
society was a strong predictor of economic success.
Furthermore, according to some political culture theorists, support for democracy
appears an important dimension in the quality of democratic institutions (Diamond &
Morlino 2005; O'Donnell, Cullell, & Iazzetta, 2004). Thus some have argued that
attitudes of the public may appear better indicators of a country’s success on a number of
social, political, and economic phenomena than traditional measures of a country’s
development, such as changes in the gross domestic product (GDP) (Inglehart & Welzel,
2003).
More generally, a number of self-expression values, such as subjective wellbeing, liberty aspirations, interpersonal trust, and others were found to be related to the
extent to which a society has developed an effective democratic infrastructure (Inglehart
& Welzel, 2006). Upon examining over 80 societies at various stages of democratic
advancement, Inglehart and Welzel (2006) concluded that “mass attitudes have a
powerful impact on the emergence and survival of democratic institutions” (p. 17). In
more detail, they used data from the World Values Survey and Freedom House ratings to
evaluate their arguments and found that such attitudes as interpersonal trust, postmaterialist values, tolerance for outgroups, and others were directly related to societallevel democracy. They further suggested that support for democracy is instrumental for
spreading democracy across the world. In his conceptual essay on the future of
democracy, Diamond (2001) also explored the role of democratic orientations among
citizens and concluded that, “One crucial dimension of consolidation involves norms and
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beliefs about the legitimacy of democracy, both in principle and as it is embodied in a
particular regime (p. 1).
In sum, much attention has been dedicated to researching formal and informal
structures and institutions within society as key factors that facilitate processes of
democratic transformation and consolidation. Of many elements that strengthen
democracy, pro-democratic attitudes and beliefs of ordinary citizens appear to play a
major role. In particular, public beliefs and attitudes toward democracy have been found
to be crucial to the processes of democratic legitimation and consolidation (Mattes, 2010;
Patrick, 1996).
Democratic Citizen Orientation and Adolescence
Because citizens do not suddenly develop democratic orientation when they reach
18 (an internationally recognized age of adulthood), pre-adult years have been identified
as an important period in the formation of democracy related attitudes (Flanagan &
Sherrod, 1998; Vygotsky, 1978). In particular, developmental psychologists have long
singled out adolescence1 as a critical stage in human development that is particularly
suitable for studying the formation and development of a variety of values and beliefs,
including sociopolitical attitudes. The theory of Erikson (1968), for example, identified
adolescence as a stage in human development typically defined by such processes as
identity formation and self-definition.
In general, it has been established that attitudes related to social and political
spheres are developed at a relatively young age and not only remain stable in later years,
1

The word “adolescence” is of Latin origin, stemming from the verb “adolescere,” which means “to grow
up,” as stated in Oxford English Dictionary.
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but even “harden” with time (for example, Sagy, Adwan, & Kaplan, 2002; Sears & Levy,
2003; Uslaner, 2002). According to Bandura (1986), because of the cumulative and
continuous nature of human experiences, individuals’ attitudes and behaviors cannot be
too dissimilar at different periods throughout a lifetime. Additionally, adolescents and
young adults’ skills and capabilities have been identified as approaching those of adults
(Erickson, 1968; Kohlberg, 1969). In emphasizing adolescents’ potential, some have
pointed to rapid cognitive and emotional development and increase in the overall
maturity as main characteristics of the period of adolescence (Berman, 1997; Yates &
Youniss, 1999).
Not only developmental research emphasizes the significance of adolescence for a
person’s development. Researchers from other disciplines have focused on adolescence
as a period that has important implications for attitudinal and behavioral preferences of
future adult generations. For example, a number of political science theorists documented
persistence of adolescents’ attitudes into adult years (Jennings, 2002; Jennings & Niemi,
1973, 1981). The basic premise underlying political socialization studies is that attitudes
and behaviors related to political and social spheres develop in young people and persist
through adulthood (Sears, 1990). In 1994, Conover and Searing described civic behavior
as “a lifelong habit that begins in childhood” (p. 33).
Empirical research has found some evidence in these theoretical claims. For
example, political trust, a core component of a democratic citizen orientation, has been
documented to be well established by age 14 (Hooghe, 2004). According to Newton and
Morris (2000), trust is as a personality trait that is formed in the early stages of
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psychological development of individuals and persists throughout life. Uslaner (2002)
further suggested that different types of trust are developed at a relatively young age and
remain stable in later years. Easton and Dennis (1967) found that by the third grade
children have developed a sense of political efficacy, another essential component in the
mind of a democratically oriented citizen. In addition, they considered children and
young adults important agents in political interaction processes who learn basic
democratic norms and values early in life.
Other researchers analyzed the stability of political attitudes between younger and
older populations and found that the level of trust in governmental institutions was
sustained throughout different developmental periods in person’s life (Hooghe, 2004;
Hooghe & Wilkenfeld, 2008). For example, Hooghe and Wilkenfeld (2008) studied
political attitudes and behaviors among adolescents and young adults from eight different
countries to determine whether substantial shifts in these attitudes occurred over time.
The study found that patterns of political trust were well established by age 14 among
adolescents from all participating states and remained similar throughout different points
in time. The analysis showed that one particular aspect of trust - generalized trust - was
among the most stable attitudes and remained virtually unchanged during adolescence
and early adulthood. Specifically, it was found that participants from three age cohorts –
adolescents (14 year olds), late adolescents (18 year olds), and young adults (18 to 30
year olds) followed a relatively stable pattern with regard to their trust attitudes.
Furthermore, others have documented children’s understanding of basic concepts
pertaining to social and political spheres (Limber, Kask, Heidmets, Kaufman, & Melton,
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1999; Melton & Limber, 1992). As highlighted by Melton and Limber (1992), children as
young as of elementary school age have basic understanding of rights and
responsibilities, including the right to have a say in matters relevant to their everyday
activities. Torney-Purta and colleagues (2004) also pointed out to the importance of
studying democratic attitudes among adolescents. In particular, they noted that “cognitive
understanding of political issues bears a complex relationship throughout life” and that
adolescence represents an important period to study it (p. 383). In their cross-country
analysis of adolescents’ political engagement, this group of researchers concluded that a
certain level of trust contributes to young people’s development of political identity,
sense of civic responsibility, and political self-efficacy. Moreover, they concluded that
trust in political institutions might provide a foundation for adolescents’ further
involvement with political activities. Upon examining children and adolescents’ patterns
of behavior in multiple contexts, Larson and Verma (2001) concluded, that “young
children and especially adolescents should be considered as resources, active agents of
change, and as a group that should be viewed in terms of their enormous potential for
having a positive influence on a society” (p. 125).
In the context of societies in transformation, studying adolescents gains additional
importance from the point of view of democratic consolidation (Dimitrova-Grajzl &
Simon, 2010; Finkel & Smith, 2011, Nikolayenko, 2011). In the words of DimitrovaGrajzl and Simon (2010), “Studying young people is important in the context of
establishing democracy and the survival of democracy” (p. 206). Of note, adolescents
coming of age at the end of the 20th century in post-communist societies of Central and
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Eastern Europe are often referred to as a “unique historical generation” (Macek et al.,
1998, p. 548). Growing up in post-communist societies, adolescents not only experienced
a world different from that of their counterparts in democratic societies, but also a world
that had little in common with experiences of their parents, older peers and even younger
generations in the same societies. For many of them, adolescence was defined not only by
personal transformations but also by larger transformation processes happening in their
societies. As Macek and colleagues (1998) noted, “they [adolescents] were trying to form
their own identity during a time when a society as a whole was searching for a new
identity” (p. 549).
Adolescents’ democratic orientations are instructive not only with regard to
implications for future developments in political and social domains, but they also could
shed some light on the current situation in these domains. For example, Garbarino (2011)
described children and youths as a “social weather vane,” meaning that they “mirror and
internalize what is going on in their society, particularly with respect to issues of
authority and norms of civic participation” (p. 444). Not surprisingly, political attitudes
of younger generations are often granted much attention in identifying or forecasting
social or political changes.
Despite a nearly universal consensus that studies of adolescents hold a significant
relevance for the fields of psychology, political science, and other disciplines, this
population appears to be understudied in democratization studies in comparison with
adults (Hooghe, 2004). A great deal of scientific evidence on democratic orientations,
including the majority of the above-noted findings, has relied on surveys and various
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research experiments conducted among adults. Similarly, there is abundant research on
social, psychological, and other effects of transition on adult population. However, few
researchers have investigated how children and adolescents have coped with
democratization. Moreover, virtually nothing is known about the nature and
characteristics of the adjustment to emerging democratic regimes among adolescents and
young adults with no direct experience of a communist rule (Nikolayenko, 2011).
Although research on adolescents’ perceptions of democratic attributes is limited,
some important insights can be gleaned from it. Thus, a study comparing adolescents and
adults’ conceptions of democracy revealed that adolescents tend to conceptualize
democracy from a more self-centered perspective than adults (Menezes & Campos,
1997). In particular, it was established that adolescents associated the meaning of
freedom with issues of personal autonomy while the same meaning in both young adults
and adults had a more universalistic meaning. Clearly, more research is needed to look
into other aspects of democratic attitudes.
Apart from the fact that expanding research on democratic orientations to include
adolescents could fill in some blanks in the literature on democratization, there are other
sound reasons to investigate adolescents’ democratic orientations based on policy
implications of such studies. Specifically, generational differences in regard to political
attitudes have been well-recognized and appear important indicators of future
developments within a political domain of society (Hooghe, 2004). As Franklin (2004)
noted, “The future lies in the hands of young people … because they are the ones who
react to new conditions” (p. 216). Illustrative in this regard are cross-cultural comparisons

17

of political engagement among adolescents as expressed in voter turnout have shown that
this type of political activity is especially in decline among younger generations
(Franklin, 2004; Plutzer, 2002).
In sum, adolescents’ attitudes are of special interest in the discourse of democratic
orientations for a number of reasons. First, it has been found that political attitudes are
formed during the period of adolescence and remain relatively stable throughout a
person’s life course life (Sagy, Adwan, & Kaplan, 2002). This finding has important
implications for policies aimed at fostering democratic values among the general
populations. Secondly, adolescents’ attitudes are valuable from the perspective of their
reflection of broader social norms and societal values. This is especially important in
terms of assessing the status of democratic developments in a specific society and
exploring the relationship between the quality of democratic institutions and adolescents’
democratic preferences. Finally, researching youths’ preferences and their views upon
certain aspects of socio-political reality have important implications for discerning future
social and political orientations of adult population and, therefore, provide better insights
into future democratic developments within a specific country. Identifying potential gaps
as well as assents in adolescents’ democratic orientations might help design better
policies aimed at fostering the culture of democracy. Barber (1992) argued that
democratically oriented citizens are not born but made. In his later statement he added
that, “We may be natural consumers and born narcissists but citizens have to be made”
(Barber, 1993, p. 43).
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Measuring Democratic Citizen Orientation
Despite a unanimous agreement on the importance of democratic citizen
orientation for democratic functioning, no consensus has been reached in terms of
measuring citizens’ appreciation of democracy and their attitudes towards core
components of a democratic society (Alvarez & Welzel, n.d.; Dalton, Shin, & Jou, 2007;
Shin 2007; Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). As Kaase (cited in Dalton, 2000) noted in this
regard almost three decades ago, “Measuring political culture is like “trying to nail jello
to the wall” (p. 914). In part, a lack of agreement on how to assess democratic political
culture or people’s democratic orientations is rooted in ongoing scholarly and policy
debates on how to measure democracy per se (Bollen, 1990; Diamond, 1997; Schedler &
Sarsfield, 2004).
Generally, a starting point in evaluating the state of democracy in a particular
society is to compare the elements of an ideal form of democracy to the features of the
society at focus. Thus, little or no disagreement exists in outlining a set of structural
elements that constitute an ideal democracy. However, questions related to the degree to
which these elements are present in a certain society and, consequently, the degree to
which that society can be called democratic are likely to produce varying responses from
different scholars, governmental authorities, or policy makers. For example, despite the
presence of democratic institutions in most post-communist societies, Rose (2009) argued
that “because of the weakness of the rule of law, no post-Soviet regime can be described
as a democracy” (p. 14). Others have pointed out to the importance of distinguishing
between liberal democracy and other types of democracy, such as multicultural,
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consociational, or ethnic democracies (Smooha, 2002; Van Den Berghe, 2002; Zakaria,
1997). Overall, despite a universal consensus on what constitutes ideal democracy,
research on concepts of actual democracy is not uniquely defined (Dahl, 1971, 1998;
Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). The nature and functioning of democratic institutions in
society continues to be a subject of many debates that have to do with democracy
promotion, democratic transition and consolidation, and other issues.
In attempts to address these concerns, some have adopted the notion of
democracy as a continuous variable. According to this view, democracy is present in
most countries to varying degrees (Bollen, 1990). As a result, continuous measures of
democracy have been introduced and continue to be widely used by a number of agencies
and individual researchers. In his article on democracy rankings, Campbell (2008)
reviewed four major initiatives that measure democracies in a global context.
Specifically, he analyzed methodological approaches and empirical strategies of the four
democracy measurement projects (a) Freedom House2, (b) Polity IV3, (c) Vanhanen’s
Index of Democracy4, and (d) Democracy Index by the Economist5. In evaluating
strengths and weaknesses of each of these approaches, Campbell pointed to inconsistent
use of democracy indicators, lack of sensitivity in terms of assigning scores to countries,
and questioned the validity and unbiased character of selected measures. He concluded
that there is still a gap in terms of empirical assessments of the quality of democracy. A

2

Country reports on democracy functioning in the world are available from Freedom in the World reports
and can be obtained online from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world.
3
For country ratings, see http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
4
Available at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Governance/Vanhanens-index-of-democracy/
5
Available with subscription only at
https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2011
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work by Collier and Levitsky (1996) further illustrates this point. In their review of
approximately 150 studies of democracy, they identified over 550 subtypes of democratic
societies.
Given a substantial variation in numerous measures of democracy, it is not
surprising that research on citizens’ democratic attitudes is just as diverse. Most
knowledge of democratic citizen orientation comes from political science studies of
support for democracy and public opinion polls. A number of large-scale research
initiatives have been launched to measure and track a variety of public attitudes toward
democracy, from support for democratic principles and values to evaluations of
democratic governance, and others. Among such measures are the World Values Survey
(WVS)6, the European Values Survey7, the New Democracies Barometers8, the Pew
Research Center9, the International Social Survey Program (ISSP)10, and many others.
These initiatives were designed to collect information on a number of public attitudes that
are relevant for democracy, including how citizens evaluate and relate to democratic
institutions in their societies, to what extent mass public understand and adhere to
democratic principles in their daily lives, what proportion of citizens support democracy
as a form of governance, and related phenomena. These and other initiatives have
produced a variety of information related to democratization processes and trends, which,
6

The WVS contains public survey data from the largest number of countries in comparison with other
initiatives. Select data from the WVS are available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
7
Available at http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/
8
Available at http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog4_0.html,
http://www.democracybarometer.org/start_en.html
Country specific rankings are available at http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog1_0.html,
http://www.arabbarometer.org/, and other websites.
9
Data available at http://pewresearch.org/
10
More details are available from the ISSP website http://www.issp.org
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in turn, has resulted in an array of studies attempting to describe and analyze these
phenomena. As Diamond (2001) noted, “Public opinion surveys are opening up an
unprecedented analytic window onto the study of the dynamics of democratic regimes,
especially what fosters democratic consolidation as opposed to stagnation, instability, or
even breakdown.” (p. 2). The challenge is to analyze all the available data in a systematic
way. As Schedler and Sarsfield (2004) noted, “If we wish to deepen our knowledge about
citizens’ democratic ideas and ideals, the most urgent task is not to collect fresh data, but
to re-analyze available data in fresh ways” (p. 8).
Although survey techniques to measure democratic attitudes vary, many
researchers have relied on one method, known as a “destination model,” as the basis for
their analyses (Rose, 2009). Generally, destination model surveys ask abstract questions
about general preferences towards basic ideas of democracy. For example, some
destination models evaluate individual or population orientations towards an idealized
model of democracy with ideal market economy and other perfect attributes. Other
destination approaches utilize questions from studies of older democracies in North
America and Western Europe, such as support for democracy, satisfaction with the
performance of democracy, trust in democratic institutions, and others (Diamond, 2008).
One of the advantages of using destination models to gauge democratic
orientations among the general public is their consistency in terms of research
instruments. As a rule, survey questions are phrased in a way that allows for longitudinal
as well as cross-country comparisons. Indeed, surveys that rely on destination models
provide a common ground for comparing states with varying degrees of democratization
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as well as comparing changes in public opinion over time. However, many have voiced
concerns over this method or opposed it altogether as having many limitations. For
example, Rose (2009) criticized destination models because of their over-reliance on
Western values and failure to consider differences found in cultures other than those in
established democracies. Others have pointed out to the fact that the concept of ideal
democracy is almost unanimously accepted worldwide and thus fails to explain variation
in democratic functioning among different societies (Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel,
2006). As Norris (cited in Mattes, 2010) noted, “By the end of the twentieth century,
overwhelming support is given to the principle of democracy as an ideal form of
government…” (p. 2). In a similar vein, Inglehart and Welzel (2006) argued that overt
endorsement of democracy has become almost universal among citizens not only from
developed democracies but also across societies with undemocratic regimes. Inglehart
(2003) further argued that abstract questions about ideal democracy that generally result
in favorable responses lack accuracy and appear of little value in determining public
attitudes toward the actual democratic functioning.
Furthermore, in the context of post-communist societies, using ideal democracy as
a reference point to gauge population attitudes fails to capture the overall picture of how
the public views democracy de facto. As Rose (2009) noted, “destination surveys
measure how near or far the values of a population are from goals defined in Western
terms. Distinctive features of the Communist legacy are left out” (p. 200). Therefore,
employing such a technique may result in an incomplete or inaccurate picture of citizen
orientations toward democratic values. In addition, Rose argued that an idealist focus on
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democracy fails to account for and explain changes that have occurred in a society, since
the starting point for democratization is a regime that lacks many attributes of a
representative democracy.
Not only destination-based surveys appear to attract some criticism on the part of
researchers or policy makers. Other indicators that measure public support for democracy
have been the subject of countless scholarly and policy debates as well. Similarly, many
have questioned the validity of numerous democracy indicators and scores that are
usually assigned to countries to denote their level of democratic advancement (for
example, Campbell, 2008; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2004). For example, Schedler and
Sarsfield (2004) in their programmatic essay on public opinion surveys of democracy
analyzed and summarized major challenges that are common for such measures. Overall,
they singled out four fundamental problems that arise when interpreting data from
surveys that have been designed to measure democratic attitudes. First, they claimed that
the so called interviewer effects, a phenomenon the authors equated with the social
desirability effect, present a substantial challenge and might compromise the validity of
survey data. In other words, the authors claimed that survey respondents may give
favorable evaluations of democracy related issues mainly because they might perceive
them as recognized social values. Of note, this problem was first addressed by Dalton
(1994) who coined the term “questionnaire democrats” to refer to individuals who give
such politically correct responses.
The second and third challenges common for survey measures of democratic
opinions have to do with the abstract nature of democratic support and democracy per se.
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In other words, people understand the concept of democracy and interpret democracy
related issues based on their personal values. As Bratton (2002) noted, democracy “can
be bent to mean what people want it to mean” (p. 6). Finally, the fourth challenge with
using public opinion data to test various theories of democracy or provide empirical
measures of democratic preferences deals with conflicting values that individuals might
have. An example of such conflicting values is a possible disconnect between political
preferences and political values. Thus, one might agree with some fundamental principles
of a functioning democracy and reject other, often less overt, assumptions about
democratic society. In sum, each of these problems or a combination of them challenges
the validity of public opinion polls as measures of democratic attitudes. Schedler and
Sarsfield thus concluded that a vast majority of public opinion surveys are “ill-designed
to capture citizen attitudes towards democratic ideas and institutions” (p. 8). Similarly,
Dalton (2000) wrote in this regard, “Public opinion is becoming more fluid and less
predictable” (p. 924).
To respond to some claims that deal with measurement of democratic attitudes,
Inglehart (2003) suggested that focus of such inquiries be shifted toward exploring
political attitudes and public support for democratic principles beyond those that
explicitly mention the most basic elements of a democratic system. Inglehart was among
the first scholars to empirically document the link between public support for a
democratic way of life and actual democratic indicators at the societal level. Specifically,
he showed that individuals’ support for values and principles that did not explicitly relate
to democracy was a better predictor of the society’s level of democratic development
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than a general positive orientation toward the concept of democracy. Such support
attitudes consisted of beliefs related to trust, tolerance, emphasis on self-expression
values as well as on subjective well-being, and others.
In his subsequent research with Christian Welzel, Inglehart further established
that public support for democratic values were more powerful indicators of a society’s
level of democracy than traditional measures from political or economic fields (Inglehart
& Welzel, 2006). In particular, they found that citizens’ attitudes and value orientations
were significantly related to several key aspects of democratic society, such as the quality
of democratic institutions, the status of women and ethnic minorities, and governance
effectiveness. Inglehart and Welzel’s (2006) findings have important implications not
only for the study of mass democratic attitudes and value orientations but also for the
measurement of democracy per se.
In sum, although much progress has been achieved in eliciting the nature and
dynamics of democratic orientations among citizens across different cultures, much
remains to be uncovered. As Dalton (2000) referred to the state of research on citizen
attitudes and political behavior, “Although we have greater scientific knowledge, our
ability to predict and explain political behavior may actually be decreasing. . .” (p. 932).
Inglehart and Welzel (2006) summarized the state of research on measures of democratic
orientations in the following way:
Techniques for measuring public support for democracy are newer and less
developed than techniques for measuring gross national product, but the relevant
mass attitudes can be measured – and when they are, they turn out to have an
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autonomous societal impact that is fully as important as that of economic factors.
(p. 3).
Democratic Citizen Orientation: Core Components
Although there is almost unanimous agreement on the importance of prodemocratic citizenry for democratic viability, a clear consensus about the structure of
democratic citizen orientation is yet to be established (Diamond, 1994; Gibson, Duch, &
Tedin, 1992; Inglehart, 2003; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2004). This complexity is rooted, in
part, in the latent nature of the concept of democratic citizen orientation, which cannot be
measured directly but can only be assessed with the help of various measurement tools.
Different scholars have singled out different aspects of democratic orientation in efforts
to capture individuals’ beliefs and attitudes that are conducive to democratic
advancement. For example, Dahl (1971) argued that to make democracy work, citizens
need to have congruent attitudes about governmental effectiveness and authorities along
with some willingness to compromise. Lipset and Lakin (2004) claimed that for an
effective democracy, citizens need to respect the rule of law, differences in opinion, and
believe in the legitimacy of a democratic regime. In turn, Schimmelfennig (2000, 2002)
emphasized such qualities of democratic public as respect for human rights, equality of
opportunity and racial and gender equality.
In short, a comprehensive review of literature from diverse disciplines suggests
that there a number of interrelated factors that are believed to be necessary for individuals
to contribute to stability and advancement of democracy. These factors range from
feelings of internal political efficacy in psychological inquiries to democratic functioning
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to perceptions of economic fairness and confidence in public officials. However, there are
few studies, especially among youth, that involve all of these ingredients.
Recognizing the highly heterogeneous and often contested nature of democratic
citizen orientation and emphasizing its interdisciplinary character, this dissertation limits
the analysis of democratic citizen orientations to four components. These separate but
interconnected components include the following aspects: (1) civil liberties (2)
participatory orientations, (3) political efficacy, and (4) trust. The selected components
are important not only because of their potential to strengthen democracy, but also
because they shed light on how people treat each other within their communities and the
larger society. Moreover, these elements reflect the multi-faceted nature of democratic
citizen orientation and, thus, appear theoretically relevant. Finally, they have been
frequently utilized in studies of democracy, democratic transitions, and consolidation,
and can be examined with the data available from the ICCS.
The sections below describe the identified core components of democratic citizen
orientation in more detail. Specifically, civil liberties component along with its
subcomponents are presented first, followed by participatory orientations and political
efficacy. The section ends with a description of the nature and significance of trust as
another important ingredient in democratic citizen orientations.
Civil Liberties
Appreciation and endorsement of civil liberties has become inseparable from
democratic discourse and is often equated with a democratic way of life. Despite
differences in the way civil liberties values are understood and studied, scholars from
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different disciplines agree that the concept of civil liberties is highly complex. In this
dissertation, civil liberties is used as an umbrella term that encompasses self-expression
values, gender equality attitudes, tolerance, and respect for diversity. The rationale for
focusing on each of these components is presented below.
Self-expression values. One of the most robust findings in research on concepts
of democracy is the confirmation of the importance of having a voice in government (for
example, see Beetham, 1994; Fuchs, 1999; Held, 1996; Schmitter & Karl, 1991; Walt
Whitman Center, 1997). Freedom of expression is reflective of broader definitions of
democracy that emphasize its representative aspect and highlight the importance of
creating and facilitating fair conditions for competing for people’s votes (Dahl, 1971;
Diamond, 2002). Huntington (1991) argued that freedom of expression, freedom of the
press, freedom of association, and other freedoms are essential components of a
democratic society in which citizens have an active role. Inglehart (2003) associated selfexpression values with Postmaterialist emphasis on civil rights and political participation
and argued that the presence of these values in society increases mass demands for
democratization.
The right to have a say in political and social matters appears to be an equally
recognized value among citizens in states at various stages of democratic development.
At the same time, the level of importance attributed to this component varies greatly
between societies with emerging democracies and societies with a well-established
democratic record.
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Of note, a substantial body of research supports the relationship between concepts
of democracy and individual rights, justice, and freedom (Moodie, Markova, & Plichtova,
1995). For example, in their study of democratic attributes in Scotland and Slovakia,
Moodie and colleagues (1995) found that among the most important terms associated
with democracy were value-oriented concepts, such as individual freedom, justice, and
individual rights. Similar results were demonstrated in a qualitative study that
investigated what democracy means to young people in Greece (Magioglou, 2003). Thus,
it was found that freedom, equality and justice, and the principles and procedures of the
representative system, such as deliberation or elections, were the most frequently
mentioned themes.
Gender equality. One of the conclusions from the literature on democratization is
confirmation of the importance of equal rights for all citizens, regardless of their gender,
ethnicity, or race. Positive attitudes toward equal rights and opportunities for every
citizen, independent of their gender, ethnic or racial origin are at the heart of democracy
and reflect the democratic ideal of emancipation and tolerance (Hahn, 1998). Applying
the concept of gender equality to democratic functioning, Tesler and Gao (2009) wrote,
“Democracy is meaningless if half the citizens of a country do not have equal rights and
equal access to political influence and power” (p. 198). In his analysis of democratic
attitudes common for Western and Muslim societies, Norris (2003) cited a lack of
widespread support for gender equality among the reasons for weak democracy in a
number of Muslim societies.
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A smaller body of research has been devoted to studying support for gender
equality and tolerance towards outgroups among younger generations. In Australia,
Kennedy and Mellor (2006) explored several concepts related to adolescent students’
perceptions of diversity and tolerance. The researchers found that female students were
more likely to support women’s political rights as well as immigrants’ rights in
comparison with male students. The 1999 Civic Education Study (CIVED) used a set of
six items to capture students’ attitudes toward women’s political rights (Torney-Purta et
al., 2001). Both surveys found that females were more supportive of women’s rights than
were males; these findings were consistent with the outcomes of other studies (Furnham
& Gunter, 1989; Hahn, 1998). The CIVED further revealed that students across countries
overwhelmingly tended to agree with statements in favor of and to disagree with
statements against equal rights for women. However, students in countries with lower
GDP per capita and higher unemployment rates were somewhat less supportive of
women’s political rights (Torney-Purta et al., 2001, p. 107).
Tolerance and respect for diversity. Central to understanding the equality
aspect of democratic citizen orientation is tolerance towards minority groups. A quick
review of relevant literature suggests that tolerance is a multidimensional concept that
encompasses many beliefs, values, and behaviors that are essential to a functioning
democracy. Political tolerance, in particular, refers to citizens' respect for political rights
and civil liberties of all groups in society, including those with completely opposite views
and ideas (Brody, 1993).

31

Although researchers differ in their explanations of sources and consequences of
effective democratic functioning, there is a general consensus that tolerance of outgroups
is key to democracy. For example, Garbarino (2011) viewed diversity as foundation for
pluralism, an inseparable part of a democratic society. In turn Gibson (1998) argued that
the existence of meaningful opposition requires tolerance of others who have different
views or disagree with a certain issue or set of norms. Tessler and Gao (2009) linked
tolerance with the legitimacy of democratic regime and considered it the essence of
participatory democracy. In similar vein, others considered that tolerance of outgroups
may be the “litmus test” of a functioning democracy (Schedler & Sarsield, 2004).
Moreover, some researchers have adopted a new classification of democratic societies
based on whether and in what ways states recognize minorities (Smooha 2002; Van Den
Berghe 2002).
In the context of aspiring democracies, tolerance has been found to facilitate
democratic consolidation by increasing citizens’ support for democratic regime. In his
research on post-communist transformation, Rose (2009) established that citizens who
display higher levels of political tolerance were significantly more likely to view
democratic regime positively than those who had lower levels of political tolerance. In
more detail, Rose found that tolerance accounted for almost a third of the variance in
individuals’ support for democratic regimes, after controlling for the effect of other
influences.
In sum, an important aspect of democratic orientation consists of valuation of
freedoms and liberties as well as attitudes towards various groups in a larger community,
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including gender equality and tolerance towards minority groups. Yet, many gaps remain
in the literature about the origins of positive attitudes towards minority groups,
consequences of gender equality, and related attitudes. Researchers continue to debate
individual sources of these values as well as country-level indicators that might account
for variation within them.
Participatory Orientation
Democratic citizen participation is a broad concept that encompasses a multitude
of ways through which citizens can express their attitudes toward the political system as
well as toward others within their communities and the larger society. Classic and
contemporary scholars of democracy have emphasized the fundamental role of citizen
participation in civic and political activities in effective democratic functioning. For
example, Dahl (1971) claimed that citizens’ participation in political life is an essential
component of democratic society. Indeed, the idea of citizen participation in political and
social domains is at the heart of democracy. As Print (2007) noted, “citizen participation
is the very raison d’etre of democracy” (p. 327). According to Ostrom (1996), civic
engagement and association “can be thought of as at the core of what it means to be a
democracy” (p. 755). In a similar vein, Schulz, Ainley, and Van de Gaer (2010) viewed
participation as “one of the pillars of a democracy whose functioning relies to a great
extent on contributions of its citizens to the democratic process” (p. 2). Overall, active
participation in social and political life has long been considered “as hallmarks of the
good democratic citizen” (Madsen, 1987, p. 580). Thus individual participatory beliefs
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and behaviors appear important and theoretically relevant constructs in the study of
democratic citizen orientation.
Generally, the significance and benefits of participation-oriented citizenry for a
democratic system are rarely contested. For the most part, democratization scholars agree
that structures within society that encourage citizen participation are key to sustainable
and healthy development of democratic society (Almond & Verba, 1960; Crick, 1998,
2002; International IDEA, 1999, 2002; Print, 2007; Putnam, 2000). Participation and
inclusion of all citizens, including children and young adults has been increasingly
recognized as an essential ingredient in building strong families, communities, and
democratic societies (Smith, 2009). In more detail, specific benefits have been identified
as the rationale for promoting greater citizen involvement in modern societies. For
example, Putnam (1993, 2000) considered citizen participation in terms of positive
outcomes for social relations and linked it with enhanced social capital and cohesion. In a
similar vein, Mascherini, Vidoni, and Manca (2011) viewed individual engagement in
various social and political activities as a “tool for accumulating social capital and
enhancing social cohesion” (p. 791). In turn, the Power Commission, a comprehensive
initiative that sought to re-engage British citizens with democracy, outlined the following
desired outcomes of citizen participation: strengthening the dialogue between higher
authorities and the general public, addressing the increasing influence of undemocratic
forces, promoting political equality among all segments of society, increasing legitimacy
of elected governments, and other outcomes (The Power Inquiry, 2006).
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In their review of civic engagement among adolescents in the U.S., Flanagan and
Levine (2010) claimed that civically involved youth is important for the functioning of
democracy. In more detail, they outlined a number of reasons why participation in civic
maters is important to the health and performance of democracy. For example, by
participating in community affairs, youth “can contribute their insights to public debates
and their energies to addressing these problems” (p. 160). On a national scale, younger
generations can be “a force for political change, by bringing new perspectives on political
issues and offering fresh solutions” (p. 160). Furthermore, in an international context,
youth can “help stabilize democratic societies by directing their discontent into
constructive channels.” (p. 160). Other studies (for example, Verba, Schlozman & Brady,
1995) have emphasized the links between adolescent participation and later involvement
as adult citizens.
Importantly, not only civic engagement among youth is important for
democracies, but it also is beneficial to younger populations themselves. Among potential
personal and psychological benefits of youth involvement, Flanagan and Levine (2010)
noted fulfillment of the human need to belong, feeling of larger life purpose beyond the
pursuit of individual gain, and others. Additionally, participation in youth organizations
was found to have positive effects on internal political efficacy among lower and upper
secondary students (Schulz, 2005).
Despite almost unanimous consensus with regard to benefits of citizen
participation in social and political matters, there are differences in the way participation
is operationalized and measured. One of the challenges of assessing and comparing
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citizen participation in different settings or across time is related to the fact that many
such measures employ perception based techniques rather than observations of the
phenomenon of interest (Mascherini, Vidoni, & Manca, 2011). In addition, another
limitation with regard to measuring citizen participation has to do with the fact that
“identically-labeled indicators are used in different setting with rather different meanings,
and it is therefore challenging to develop consistent indicators that can allow conclusions
to be drawn across local, state, and national frameworks” (Cavaye, 2004, as cited in
Mascherini, Vidoni, & Manca, 2011, p. 792).
In addressing these challenges, different scholars have suggested different
approaches to measuring citizen participation. For example, Print (2006) proposed a set
of three indicators to assess citizens’ overall engagement with political and social
matters. First, he focused on civic indicators that included information related to
membership in civic organizations, volunteering, participation in community projects,
fundraising for charities, and others. Secondly, he singled out a group of electoral
indicators that gather data related to voting, involvement in political parties and
contributions to political campaigns. Finally, Print distinguished a set of political
engagement indicators that consisted of participation in protests, writing petitions
(including email and internet engagement), boycotting products, and related activities.
Putnam’s (2000) conceptualization of democratic participation is centered around
the theme of civic engagement and is viewed in tandem with social capital. Specifically,
Putnam used membership in national organizations and community groups as indicators
of citizen participation. Others have distinguished between different forms of citizen
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democratic participation. Thus, Kaase (1990) singled out two main types of citizen
engagement (a) conventional engagement, such as voting, running for office and (b)
unconventional or social movement engagement, such as participation in grass-root
campaigns, protest activities, and other less formal activities.
With regard to younger populations, research on participation is less uniquely
defined. Given the limitations 14-year-old students face with regard to active
participation, behavioral intentions for what they expect to do in the future has emerged
as being of particular importance for this age group (Schulz, Ainley, & Van de Gaer,
2010, p. 3).
Despite a growing attention to issues of citizen participation in political and social
spheres and efforts to promote citizen engagement in many states, democratic
participation has been on decline (Dalton, 19999; Putnam, 2000; Schulz, Ainley, & Van
de Gaer, 2010). Although declining citizen participation is a problem of many modern
societies, it has become especially evident in established democracies where fewer and
fewer citizens appear be actively engaged in political and social matters (Dalton, 1999).
Of note, these negative trends are especially characteristic of younger populations (Kirby
& Kawashima-Ginsburg, 2009; McDonald, 2008). For example, in the United States,
political scientists and sociologists have been observing the downward trend in youth
voting since the 1970s (Flanagan, Levine, & Settersten, 2009). Exceptions have been
2004 and 2008 presidential elections when youth turnout rate almost doubled (Kirby &
Kawashima-Ginsburg, 2009). In their analysis of generational differences in life goals,
concern for others, and civic orientation among young adults in the U.S., Twenge,
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Campbell, and Freeman (2012) found that today’s young Americans were less concerned
with social problems and had less interest in government in comparison with older
generations. In addition, they documented that modern young people were less likely “to
participate in the political process through voting, writing to a public official,
participating in demonstrations or boycotts, or giving money to a political cause” than
older generations (p. 12). That today’s youths “are less engaged in civic and political
activities than their predecessors were 30 years ago” is supported by evidence from a
number of surveys, including National Election Surveys, General Social Surveys (in the
United States), that document declines in various forms of engagement among younger
populations (Flanagan, Levine, & Settersten, 2009, p. 1).
Similar observations were made and documented in other developed democracies.
For example, in Great Britain, youth participation in national elections presents a similar
picture of disengaged youth. The Electoral Commission (2005) documented that the
youth vote declined to 37%, the lowest turnout on record. In Canada’s 2000 elections,
only 22% of young voters cast their votes (Pammett & LeDuc, 2003). Australia, a
country with compulsory voting for all citizens, shows surprisingly low levels of youth
voting (Print, Saha, & Edwards, 2004). However, it is important to remember that
although important, voting is just one aspect of citizen democratic participation. That is
why it is critical to consider other dimensions of citizen involvement that extend beyond
voting or other traditional indicators of political involvement.
Others have also documented limited interest and involvement of younger
generations in public and political life (Schulz, Fraillon, Ainley, Losito, & Kerr, 2008).
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According to results of a recent large-scale study of young adults by Smith et al. (2011),
only about 4% of modern young people are “genuinely civically and politically engaged”
(p. 208). Sloam (2007) wrote about young people’s alienation from political and social
processes, “The current generation of young people see themselves as individuals
distanced from the state and politics, … they [youth] expect less from the state and
consequently have a weaker sense of solidarity,” (p. 550). He further noted that is
reflected in “the weakening of political socialization and attachment to conventional
forms of politics” (p. 550).
Of note, most of the conclusions from the literature on civic participation among
different populations have been drawn from empirical studies of established democracies.
Information about the nature of individuals’ engagement in social and political activities
of countries, other than Western Europe or is less easily available. Especially scarce in
this regard is trend data. More generally, Dalton noted about a lack of international data
on political behaviors and attitudes of ordinary citizens, “A notable feature for
comparative politics is the limited attention to these questions in the non-American
literature” (p. 921).
In sum, one of the robust findings of democratization research is that citizen
participation is a vital component of a healthy democracy and is essential for its effective
functioning (Smart, 2000; UNICEF, 2007). Friedland (2006) summarized the importance
of politically engaged citizenry, “in a functioning legitimate democracy . . . citizens do
need to vote, follow news, and that solidarity with fellow citizens in some form is
necessary” (p. 2). Given that democracy can function most effectively when its citizens
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show an active interest in countries’ social and political affairs, the observed declines in
young people’s involvement in social and political activities is of concern and should be
given more attention.
Political Efficacy
One of the key values associated with a democratic way of life is a feeling of
political efficacy, a belief that “one has the skills to influence the political system’’
(Zimmerman, 1989, p. 554). Democratic theorists traditionally have emphasized the
importance of citizens’ feelings of efficacy by singling it out as one of the main factors
that contribute to the legitimacy of a democratic regime and its stability (Finkel, 1985;
Rudolph et al., 2000). Recalling from studies reviewed above, citizens’ confidence in the
legitimacy of government is positively linked to societal stability. Therefore, it is
reasonable to expect that political efficacy would be another influential factor in the
functioning of democracy and, thus, a relevant component of citizen democratic
orientation.
Early inquiries into the study of political efficacy are essential to the modern
understanding of the concept. Researchers from different disciplines have contributed to
theoretical accounts of political efficacy. With roots in Albert Bandura’s seminal work on
self-efficacy in human behavior, the concept of political efficacy is generally used to
denote a positive feeling that “political and social change is possible, and that the
individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change” (Campbell, Gurin, &
Miller, 1954, p. 187). First efforts to operationalize the concept date back to mid-1950s,
when Campbell and colleagues developed a scaled measure of political efficacy.
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Specifically, they used four statements about individuals’ attitudes toward political
processes, including the following items: "People like me don't have any say about what
the government does"; "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a
person like me can't really understand what is going on"; and "I don't think public
officials care much what people like me think." Although Campbell’s conceptualization
gained much popularity and was commonly used as a measure of citizen political
efficacy, other researchers have adopted slightly different approaches to conceptualizing
political efficacy. For example, in an effort to conceptualize political efficacy, Janowitz
and Marvick (1956) proposed the term “political self-competence” and Almond and
Verba (1963) used the phrase “subjective political competence” (as cited in Madsen,
1987, p. 572). In the 1990s, Bandura applied the concept of self-efficacy to political
domain to define a new concept that is rooted in “the belief that one can produce effects
through political action” (1993, p. 483). He also established that feelings of political
efficacy were context-bound, with individuals displaying different levels of political
efficacy, depending on “domains of activities, situational circumstances, and functional
roles” (Bandura, 1997, p. 485).
One of the most important features of political efficacy is its multidimensional
character. Two commonly used dimensions of political efficacy are (a) internal and (b)
external (Anderson, 2010; Bandura, 1993; Finkel, 1985; Iyengar, 1980; Niemi, Craig, &
Mattei, 1991). Internal political efficacy refers to a sense of efficacy or control to
influence political developments. In turn, external political efficacy is understood in
terms of perceptions of the effectiveness of political system or responsiveness of political
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figures to the needs of the general public. Although the distinction between internal and
external forms of political efficacy is the most commonly utilized classification, it is just
one way of addressing the multidimensional character of the concept. Different
approaches differentiate between other aspects of political efficacy. Easton and Dennis
(1967), for example, singled out three aspects of political efficacy (a) normative, (b)
psychological, and (c) a behavioral aspect. They argued that each aspect represented
separate but interdependent elements that are key to understanding the nature of political
efficacy. In more detail, the normative aspect refers to “the expectation in democracies
that members will feel able to act effectively in politics” (p. 26) and that citizens will
view their local or national authorities as responsive agents. Psychological aspect of
political efficacy identifies “a disposition towards politics, a feeling of effectiveness and
capacity in the political sphere” (p. 26). Finally, in behavioral terms, political efficacy has
to do with the actual behavior of a given individual or a group of individuals. Easton and
Dennis claimed that such a differentiation between three different aspects helps avoid
confusion and ambiguity that are often associated with the term.
Apart from theoretical inquiries, political efficacy has been often utilized in
empirical studies. In the political domain, the concept of political efficacy has been
commonly used in studies of political behavior. Especially numerous in this regard are
studies investigating the impact of political efficacy on political participation or lack of
thereof. Citizens who display higher levels of political self-efficacy have been found to
engage more frequently in various political activities (Abrams & DeMoura, 2002; Finkel,
1985; Rudolph et al., 2000). In turn, it has also been suggested that deficits of political
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efficacy can result in alienation from political processes. Importantly, early research has
also established the reciprocal character of political efficacy, with feelings of political
efficacy influencing a number of feelings and behaviors and vice versa.
Some researchers have investigated the relationship between political efficacy and
trust in political institutions. Thus, external political efficacy has been found to be
associated with general trust in the functioning of the political system and institutions
(Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). In addition, evidence was established that individuals
who report higher levels of political efficacy are psychologically engaged in political and
social matters (Cohen, Vigoda, & Samorly, 2001).
Political efficacy has been a popular concept in comparative research. With regard
to studies of transitioning democracies, a few interesting observations are of interest. For
example, Rose (2009) analyzed a number of the New Russia Barometer11 surveys that
measured citizens’ political efficacy beliefs and concluded that modern populations in
post-communist societies do not perceive themselves as having more influence on
government than under the former regime. At the same time, Rose noted that in spite of
the continuing lack of political efficacy, the majority of people nowadays believe that the
state can no longer control their lives as was the case in the previous regime. Rose’s
findings are consistent with earlier research on political efficacy among citizens in
transitioning societies that emphasized low levels of political efficacy among the general
public. Thus, in his research on the course of democratic transformations in postcommunist societies, Krastev (2007) explained that ordinary citizens experienced
11

The New Russia Barometer has been conducting public opinions surveys in Russia since 1992. More
information about surveys is available at http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog1_0.html
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transitional democracies as regimes where voters “could change governments but could
not change policies” (p. 59).
Research on political efficacy among adolescents and young adults is less
common in comparison with studies among adults. In part, a smaller body of research on
political efficacy among adolescents can be explained by the fact that adolescents have
limited opportunities to engage in political activities that contribute to the development of
feelings and attitudes associated with political efficacy. At the same time, others have
argued that despite some limitations and difficulties in applying political efficacy to study
children and adolescents, political efficacy has been identified as a valid construct for
children (Easton & Dennis, 1967; Hess & Torney, 1967). In particular, Easton and
Dennis argued that “by grade 3 children have already begun to form an attitude..., which
we could call a sense of political efficacy.” (p. 31).
Different scholars focused on different aspects of political efficacy among
younger generations. For example, Salomon (1984) investigated sixth graders’ efficacy
beliefs about media and found that the former was related to the amount of effort
adolescents put into processing information from a specific media source, television or
print. In exploring the effect of television viewing on adolescents’ civic participation,
Hoffman and Thompson (2009) established a positive relationship between the two
variables of interest and also found that it was mediated by adolescents’ political efficacy.
Another researcher undertook a cross-cultural analysis of political efficacy among
adolescents from five countries (Hahn, 1998). She discovered that adolescents from
Denmark and the United States were more efficacious than their peers from Germany,
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Netherlands, and England. In addition, Hahn found that adolescents from all countries
reported low levels of confidence in their ability to influence explicit political decisions.
By contrast, most participants reported high to moderate levels of confidence in
influencing governmental decisions made by groups. An interesting gender aspect of
political efficacy was documented in the initial analyses of ICCS data, which revealed
that male students reported higher levels of internal political efficacy than did female
students.
A significant amount of efficacy research among children and adolescents focuses
on the role of schools in fostering such attitudes. Most such studies emphasize the
formative role of school environment in shaping adolescents’ beliefs, including feelings
of political efficacy. According to Bandura (1997), adolescents’ beliefs about their
efficacy with regard to political and social situations are related to the extent to which
adolescents take part in school activities.
In sum, based on earlier theoretical and empirical inquiries into key conditions
necessary for democratic maintenance and development, political efficacy appears to be
an important component. Therefore, it is justifiable to include adolescents’ confidence in
their ability to make meaningful contributions to political and social in this research.
Trust
Few topics receive as much attention in democratization studies as issues related
to trust. In general, there is almost a unanimous agreement that some form of trust is
required for the growth and development of a democratic society (Fisher, Van Heerde, &
Tucker, 2010; Mishler & Rose, 2005; Rose, 2004; Uslaner, n.d., 2008; Van der Meer,
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2010). The vast literature on trust provides various accounts of the importance of trusting
citizenry. For example, Dahl (1971) considered trust among key conditions of effective
“polarchy” (democracy) and Inglehart (1999) argued that trust was the foundation of a
democratic society. According to Moises (2006), trust appears “necessary social cohesion
required by the functioning of complex, unequal and differentiated societies” (p. 591).
Other researchers have claimed that trust enhances the legitimacy and stability of the
government by linking citizens with government representatives through relevant
institutions (Levi & Stoker, 2000). As Blind (2006) noted, “[trust] emerges as one of the
most important ingredients upon which the legitimacy and sustainability of political
systems are built.” (p. 3).
A growing body of research on trust has documented various relationships
between the levels of trust in society and a number of social, economic, and political
phenomena. For example, Uslaner (2006) argued that trust is the key to better
government, greater economic growth, and more tolerance among members of the
society. According to him, more trusting societies have less corruption than societies with
lower levels of trust. Putnam (1993) considered trust an essential component of social
capital and related it to more efficient local governments. Fukuyama (1995, 2000)
believed that the level of trust among the members of society was a strong predictor of
economic success. A study of trust among students from states at various stages of
democratic development showed that students with higher levels of trust were more likely
to be involved in civic and political activities than those who were less trusting (TorneyPurta, Richardson, & Barber, 2004). Results of this study also supported earlier claims

46

that individuals from states with a durable and stable democratic record have higher
levels of trust than those from states in aspiring democracies. Norris (1999) used
Freedom House ratings to show that trust is higher in states with better records of respect
to political rights and civil liberties. In addition to establishing a significant positive
relationship between students’ trust and their expected civic engagement, Torney-Purta,
Richardson, and Barber (2004) also found that this relationship was complex, with many
covariates influencing the direction of the relationship.
Of note, research findings vary on the nature of the relationship between trust and
political and civic engagement, which, in turn, are closely related to democratic
developments within society (Torney-Purta et al., 2001). There is an ongoing debate
whether trusting people are more likely to participate in political life or be passive
citizens. A general assumption is that political trust is a necessary foundation on which
citizen participation is built (Marschall, 2001; Putnam, 1993; 2000). For example,
research by Torney-Purta and colleagues (2001, 2004) indicated that individuals with
higher levels of trust were more likely to participate in civic and political activities than
those with lower trust levels. Conversely, Uslaner and Brown (2005) suggested that it
may actually be a lack of trust that leads to citizen engagement in political matters. In a
similar vein, others suggested some mistrust in government may, in fact, be beneficial
with regard to citizen engagement and might increase political participation, especially
when combined with higher levels of political efficacy (Haste , 2004; Kahne &
Westheimer, 2006). Furthermore, Levi and Stoker (2000) in their overview of literature
on political trust questioned a widespread assumption that more trusting citizens were
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more likely to participate in political activities. They concluded that only in combination
with other more influential factors political trust can be equated with engagement in
political activities. Hardin (1999) considered trust irrelevant for the functioning of the
democratic government. According to him, for trust to emerge, there should be sufficient
interest and knowledge on the part of the involved individual towards another individual
or an institution. Therefore, Hardin claimed that distant relations often characterizing the
relationship between ordinary citizens and the government are insufficient for the
emergence of trust.
Despite these claims, political trust is considered an important ingredient in the
functioning of modern democracies, regardless of the level of democratic advancement.
By contrast, a lack or absence of trust is often viewed as a threat to sustainable
development within society. Given the importance of a trusting citizenship for a
country’s development, it is not surprising that many researchers and policymakers have
expressed concerns about declining levels of political trust worldwide. The World
Economic Forum (2002) drew the global attention to alarming declines in public trust in
key institutions essential for society’s development. Drawing on the results of a Gallup
International survey, conducted in 47 countries and representative of 1.4 billion citizens
across the world, the Forum reiterated the fact that trust was at record low levels.
Importantly, it was found that out of the 17 institutions that were examined, the principal
political institution in each state (parliament, congress, etc.) was the least trusted.
Unfortunately, the results of this particular survey did not come as a surprise – over the
past couple of decades, political scientists, sociologists, and statisticians have registered a
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steady decline in trust attitudes among world’s population (Lenard, 2005). Similarly,
surveys conducted among adolescents and young adults show a consistent decline in
positive responses to trust-related questions (Blind 2006; Lenard, 2005; Mishler & Rose,
2001, 2005). In his analysis of trust trends among youths, Dalton (2002) argued that the
next generation has a likelihood of being distrusting toward political institutions. Of note,
a continuing decline in citizens’ trust is a worrying trend in advanced democracies as well
as those states that are at various stages of democratic transformations.
Some concerns over declining trust have been tested empirically and evidence
was found that deficits of trust can cause a number of adverse impacts. A substantial
body of research has linked declines in trust to various negative consequences for the
government and society as a whole, such as political passivity expressed through voting
behavior (Jones & Hudson, 2000), tax evasion as an expression of unwillingness to
cooperate with the state (Orviska & Hudson, 2003), and excessive and inefficient
managerial practices (Ruscio, 1996). In his research on social polarization in Armenia,
Harutyunyan (2006) came to conclusion that low levels of social and political trust
among citizens go hand-in-hand with low scores of democracy. Similarly, Mishler and
Rose (2005) argued that deficits of trust in political institutions might increase support for
undemocratic regimes.
In sum, there is an agreement that trust is an essential ingredient in the
functioning of modern democratic societies (Mishler & Rose, 2005; Rose, 2004; TorneyPurta et al., 2004; Uslaner, n.d., 2008; Van der Meer, 2010). Citizens with higher levels
of trust have been found to be more involved in civic and political actions than those with
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less trust in state institutions or authorities. However, more remains to be uncovered with
regard to the nature of this relationship as well as the relationship between trust and other
forms of democratic citizen orientation, particularly across different age groups and
across cultures.
Democratic Citizen Orientations in Aspiring and Established Democracies
Over the past several decades, there has been a dramatic increase in democratic
developments across the world (Damon, 1998; Geddes, 1999; Hungtingon, 1991; TorneyPurta et al., 2001). The third wave of democratization, a term introduced by Samuel
Huntington (1991) to denote a rapid expansion of democratic regimes in different parts of
the world, brought many changes to the political outlook of the modern world. A defining
phenomenon of this period was a substantial increase in the number of countries that
began to be classified as democratic states (Diamond, 1997). Reports from the Freedom
House, a nongovernmental organization that has been analyzing and promoting
democratic developments globally for over seven decades, are illustrative in this regard.
According to Freedom in the World 2011, the latest annual survey of the state of global
political rights and civil liberties, the number of countries qualifying as free democracies
stood at 87, almost a twofold increase from 1972, when there were 44 free democratic
states. Overall, nearly 43% of today’s global population lives in democratic countries.
Changes in the democratic outlook of the world have been accompanied by a
surge of interest on the part of scholars who have tried to explore, explain, and predict the
course of democratic advancement. In many ways, a starting point of academic inquiries
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into the global democratic expansion is a discussion on what democracy means for the
general population and how it is perceived (Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 1997; 2003a).
Generally, democracy enjoys a predominantly positive image not only among
populations of established democracies in Western Europe and the United States, but in
societies across the world. In present-day Central Europe, unlike in Europe in the 1930s,
there is no ideological alternative to democracy (Krastev, 2007). As Gilley (2009) noted,
“Democracies tend to produce polities that are more stable, wealthier, fairer, more
innovative, and better at respecting rights than any available alternatives” (p. 114). Some
have argued that democracy has become the global dominant regime (for example,
Campbell, 2008) and others consider it an emerging universal value (Diamond, 2008). A
great deal of empirical data supports these claims.
One of the most robust findings from surveys of popular support for democracy is
the persistence of favorable opinions toward democracy as the best form of government
across the globe (Diamond, 2008). Thus upon reviewing literature on democratic
progress in the world and in particular on the way citizens in different regions of the
world view democracy, Diamond (2008) concluded that the majority of citizens in every
part of the globe “consistently avow their support for democracy as a goal” (p. x). In
more detail, based on the findings of the World Values Survey, he documented that
approximately 80% of citizens in every region of the world, including transitioning
societies in Eastern and Central Europe and semi-democratic states in the Muslim Middle
East, show high support for democracy. As noted in a report of the Pew Research
Center’s Global Attitudes Project dedicated to the 20 years anniversary after the
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disintegration of the Soviet Union, “Eastern Europeans have largely embraced
democratic values. Most want civil liberties, competitive elections and other tenets of
democracy” (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2009, p. 21).
However, despite the overwhelming support democracy enjoys in the world, it
does not perform in the same way in all of the world’s regions and countries. As Berman
(2010) noted, “the disagreeable, perhaps even tragic, fact that in much of the world the
conditions most favorable to the development and maintenance of democracy are
nonexistent, or at best only weakly present” (p. 145). Rose’s (2009) observation is
particularly illustrative in this regard. He observed that “elections in the majority of postSoviet states routinely demonstrate that unfree and unfair practices from the Soviet era
persist through the present days” (p. 114).
Some scholars view public dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy and
a lack of confidence in the future of democracy among the major obstacles on the way to
a successful democratic consolidation (for example, Diamond, 2008). Others have
pointed to high levels of apathy and alienation among the general public as reasons for
deteriorating democratic performance in many modern societies, which adds to
frustration with democracy (Rose, 2004). For example, Flanagan and Sherrod (1998)
expressed concerns with regard to growing disparities on a number of indicators of social
and economic well-being among different population groups and argued that such allpenetrating inequalities can lead to “civic disaffection and the lack of social integration,”
especially among younger generations (p. 450).
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Alternatively, many theorists have argued that a lack of advancement in
democratization processes across many societies in transition is related to inability or
unwillingness of the general population to adapt to new democratic realities and their
general resistance to or even incompatibility with democratic values (Chandler, 2006;
Fukuyama, 2001; Huntington, 1993, 1996). In a similar vein, others have expressed an
opinion that “people in certain cultures have an inherently weak desire for greater
freedoms, economic opportunity, and democratic accountability” (Walker, 2011, p. 2).
Indeed, public doubts about benefits and merits of democracy as applied to their societies
are among the most commonly cited arguments that seek to explain failures of
democratic reforms and a lack of democratic advancement. For example, according to the
global survey Voice of the People 2006, citizens in Central European states are most
skeptical about the merits of democracy in comparison with citizens in other regions of
the world (Krastev, 2007). A persistent lack of tangible improvements in many aspects of
social reality resulted in frustration with the whole concept of transition and growing
skepticism about current and future democratic development.
Findings from the 2011 Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project12 further
support this point. According to this report, less than a quarter of the total population in
post-communist countries, such as Russia, Lithuania and Ukraine, give positive
assessment of the current state of democracy in their countries. Of note, younger
generations are happier with the way democracy is working in their states than are their
older counterparts. By contrast, support for democracy as the best form of government is
12

Full report is available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/12/05/confidence-in-democracy-andcapitalism-wanes-in-former-soviet-union/
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widespread among citizens in established democracies, although some have warned about
declines in favorable attitudes toward democracy in advanced democratic states (for
example, Dalton, 2004). At the same time, it is important to note that despite some
disillusionment with democratic transformations, people in the majority of postcommunist states still value democratic ideals and “embrace key features of democracy,
such as fair judiciary and free media” (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2011, p. 1).
Despite obvious differences in democratic attitudes between citizens in
established and aspiring democracies, there are some similarities in terms of their
endorsement, or lack of thereof, of key aspects of democratic citizen orientation. For
example, political efficacy, an essential component of democratically oriented citizens
seems to be in deficit among both citizens in established and aspiring democracies. Thus,
according to a report from the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2009), no modern country
has a majority of citizens who agree with a statement “most elected officials care what
people like me think” (p. 33). Similarly, hostile opinions towards ethnic, racial, or other
minority groups are equally pervasive in established and aspiring democracies. For
example, 84% of citizens in Czech Republic have an unfavorable view of the Roma
minorities, the same percentage as in Italy (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2009). Of note,
although many citizens in post-communist societies of Eastern and Central Europe
express negative views of specific minorities in their societies, the majority of them
endorse the ideal of a pluralistic society. Thus more than half of citizens in established
and new democracies agree with a statement “It is a good thing for any society to be
made up of people from different races, religions and cultures” (p. 49).
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Overall, despite a voluminous body of literature that focuses on public support for
democracy within a specific nation or world region, cross-regional studies of democratic
orientations are few (Mattes, 2010). Many scholars and political leaders have voiced
concerns over economic and political processes in transitioning countries that might
threaten democratic developments or even lead to a return to a totalitarian system
(Diamond, 2001; Motyl, 2004; Walker, 2011).
In sum, democracy appears to enjoy universal support and, as Diamond (2008)
suggested, the prospects for democracy seem favorable. People in different parts of the
world seem to be naturally drawn to freedoms and liberties that accompany democracy as
well as to basic values and principles that allow for a democratic way of life. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the majority of post-communist countries have adopted the democratization
agenda over the past two decades. However, the process has produced mixed results with
regard to citizens’ acceptance of democratic values and principles. While there are
different opinions about why democracy have not yet taken root in some Eastern and
Central European societies, a common theme uniting them is that of the communist past.
The sections that follow briefly review the literature on historical legacies and examine
links between citizen democratic orientation and different types of historical legacies.
Historical Legacies and Democratic Citizen Orientation
The historical legacies literature provides a useful framework for analyzing
democratic attitudes among the general public and for comparing them across different
regions. Although scholars disagree about the criteria that are used to define a historical
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legacy, there is a general consensus that the past matters (Wittenberg, 2010). In the words
of Joseph Schumpeter (quoted in Rose, Mishler, & Munro, 2006):
No decade in the history of politics, religion, technology, painting, poetry and
what not ever contains its own explanation. In order to understand the religious
events from 1520 to 1530 or the political events from 1790 to 1800 or the
developments in painting from 1900 to 1910, you must survey a period of much
wider span (p. 25).
In his programmatic essay about the role and impact of history, Tilly (2006) listed
a number of reasons why “history matters” and why explanations in political field are not
sufficient without a thorough historical analysis of past events, including past regimes. In
a similar vein, Eckstein (cited in Dalton, 2000) wrote that, “… political cultures change
only gradually and often there is a syncretism between the cultural norms of the ancien
regime and the new political order” (p. 915).
Many studies of historical legacies emphasize the impact of past regimes and
traditions for the development of contemporary institutions and, less often, behavioral
norms and beliefs. Empirical research has documented the consistency with which older
institutional arrangements and norms persist into the present (Barany & Volgyes, 1995;
Bunce, 2005; Kitschelt et al., 1999). For example, Gibson (2001) argued that the legacy
of totalitarianism in Russia manifests itself in people’s continued mistrust of authorities,
weak civil society, overemphasis on personal networks and disregard of formal
structures, among others. Analyzing the impact of Stalinism on Russia’s contemporary
society, Bernhard (1996) wrote that Stalinist legacy still persists in political cultures
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across post-Soviet societies and is evident in citizens’ “learned helplessness, receptivity
to paternalism, and a confrontational attitude toward conflict” (p. 323). Indeed, upon
analyzing obstacles to successful democratization in many transitioning states, Diamond
(2008) noted a particularly weak state of the rule of law, which he partly attributed to a
generally accepted proposition that informal practices of personal power often “trump”
formal institutions and laws (p. 145).
Furthermore, in the case of studies focusing on democratic transitions and
consolidation, historical legacies are often linked to failures or successes in the process of
democratization (Bunce, 2004; Motyl, 2004; Wittenberg, 2010). For example, in his
analysis of Urugway’s democratic development, Gillispie (1986) proposed that “the
degree of restoration of the democratic ancient regime is proportional to the length of the
previous democracy’s life, and inversely related to the length of the authoritarian
interlude” (p. 193). In their review of post-communist political parties, Kitschelt,
Mansfedova, Markowski, and Toka (1999) documented how pre-communist political
infrastructure influenced the development of post-communist political arrangements.
Ishiyama (2009) further investigated the role of historical legacies with regard to
political party affiliation among citizens in the former Soviet Union and East-Central
Europe. Specifically, he studied how and to what extent institutional legacy of the
communist regime affected the emergence of a structured party system in different
societies. In more detail, Ishiyama sought to establish whether historical legacies help
explain the growth of the “red-brown” phenomenon, which he identified as a political
movement of extreme right voters who “glorify a national past, are often irredentist or
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imperialist …, are intolerant of “aliens,” and oppose globalization” (p. 485). The results
revealed that emergence of extreme right political parties and the proportion of extreme
right voters was largely determined by previous pre-communist national identities as well
as the legacy of the communist regime. Of note, a number of other legacies that Ishiyama
included in his analysis, such as the imperial legacy, historical national identities,
demographic and geographic legacies, appeared to have no significant influence on the
development of political parties. One of the main implications of the study is the
confirmation of the long-debated relationship between past and contemporary regimes,
and specifically that more recent regime legacies have a greater influence on political
arrangements within a state than its longer-term historical legacies.
Overall, a growing body of literature has documented the relationship between
democratization progress on the one hand and a country’s historical legacy on the other.
For example, in his examination of the course of democratic transitions in the former
Soviet Union and East Central Europe, Motyl (2004) divided the societies at focus into
three clustered groups according to their overall level of advancement towards
democracy. The suggested categories included countries that were classified as (a)
market-oriented democracies, (b) dictatorships, and (c) parasitic authoritarian regimes. In
providing the rationale for such a classification, Motyl noted that “the emergence and
persistence of the three clusters … [are] the product of systemic forces inherited from the
communist past” (p. 52). In emphasizing the role of historic legacies for the pace of
democratization, he further argued that, “The degree to which the state dominated
political, economic, cultural, and social life in a particular communist country determined
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the ease with which non-totalitarian institutions, such as those instantiated in democracy,
the market, rule of law, and civil society, could emerge in post-totalitarian
circumstances” (p. 57).
In a similar vein, Zakaria (2003) emphasized the role of historic legacies for a
country’s democratic advancement. Specifically, he argued that societies with no or
limited histories of democratic governance face multiple obstacles in developing effective
democratic institutions, which may undermine democratizations efforts underway in such
countries. More generally, in his seminal work on the role of Lenin’s rule, Jowitt (1992)
argued that Leninist legacies, common for all former East Bloc countries in Europe, favor
an authoritarian rather than liberal, democratic and capitalist way of life (p. 293).
In summary, one of the most common arguments in the literature on historical
legacies and democratic transitions is that characteristics of previous regimes appear
important elements in understanding and predicting developments in transitioning
societies (Dalton, 2000; Huntington, 1991; Ishiyama, 2009; Kitschelt, 1995, 1997;
Minkenberg, 2009; Motyl, 2004). Consequently, many political theorists have relied on
various manifestations of historical legacies in their explanations of democratic
advancement or stagnation in such states. However, there is no agreement as to what
features of a specific regime should be considered. Similarly, questions on how to
differentiate between various subtypes within the same regime appear a subject of many
scholarly debates.
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Post-communist Legacies
Although a substantial part of Eastern and Central European community shares a
communist past, these historic legacies are not same (Dimitrova-Grajzl & Simon, 2010;
Kitschelt, 1995, 1997). Many post-socialist countries that are often grouped together
under the umbrella term socialist regime, in fact, varied substantially with regard to their
overall level of political and social freedoms, access to the West, attitudes toward market
reforms, and other issues (Bunce, 2004; Motyl, 2004). As Rothschild (1989) wrote, “the
persistence and resilience of distinct and diverse political cultures within the matrix of
common Communist institutions is quite striking” (p. 78). In addition, pre-communist
histories of these societies are diverse, with a number of distinct characteristics in
political, social, economic, and cultural domains. As Barany (1995) noted with regard to
people in post-communist societies, “The people of this region possess widely different
cultures, traditions, histories, levels of economic development, and patterns of social
relations” (p. 289). That is why it is important to distinguish between various regimes
types.
One of the most comprehensive analyses of communist regimes and their
influence on the development of democratic institutions in post-communist societies is
work by Kitschelt (1995, 1997). Kitschelt introduced a classification of socialist regimes
based on the overall restrictiveness of party systems as well as on the extent of powers
exercised by the communist party elite. More specifically, he argued that communist
regimes varied with regard to the following three criteria: (a) the degree of “contestation”
over political issues and beyond, (b) the extent of expressing political dissent within a

60

party, and (c) the level of bureaucratic professionalism. Based on these criteria, Kitschelt
distinguished between three types of socialism: accommodative, patrimonial, and
bureaucratic. Importantly, Kitschelt emphasized the importance of political arrangements
that preceded communist regimes. He argued that pre-communist experiences had an
influence on the communist regime, which ultimately has an impact on contemporary
arrangements in social, political, and economic spheres.
Although comprehensive from the political standpoint, Kitschelt’s typology has
been criticized for its exclusion of issues that extend beyond the political arena. Thus
Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon (2010) argued that analysis of communist regimes is not
complete without an adequate review of economic and social aspects of the communist
reality. Taking into consideration two additional criteria – the level of economic freedom
and the overall restrictiveness of the regime, Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon modified
Kitschelt’s classification to account for these differences. Borrowing Kitschelt’s labels
for different regimes, they proposed an alternative typology that included four categories:
(a) Accommodative communist legacy – some freedoms, some dissent, some
access to west; medium to low overall restrictiveness; market-oriented
(b) Bureaucratic – high level of bureaucratic institutionalization, little political
freedom, medium to high restrictiveness;
(c) Patrimonial – low levels of bureaucratic professionalism, no political or
economic freedoms, no access to the West, high restrictiveness and isolation;
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(d) Yugoslav – self-management, free movement to the West, desire for
independence from USSR ideology and its political influence, intermediate
levels of contestation, and some dissent.
Connecting Historical Legacies to Democratic Citizen Orientation
Comparative research of trajectory of democratic states has shown that historical
legacies appear important components in explaining country’s political, social, and
economic outcomes (Motyl, 2004; Tilly, 2006; Wittenberg, 2010). However, the link
between a country’s communist legacy and current or future democratic orientation of its
population is a subject of many scholarly debates. There is little systematic research on
how different population cohorts are affected by historical legacies. Even less is known
about the role of various legacies on shaping democratic orientation of ordinary citizens,
including younger citizens with no direct experience of living under communist regime.
Rose (2009) denoted the state of the literature on historical legacies and individual’s
values and beliefs in the following way, “Although devoid of generalizability,
ethnographic studies serve as a reminder that attitudes and habits formed in the old
regime can and do persist” (p. 200).
In speculating about implications of the communist past, Barany (1995) pointed
out, “Although the Communist political institutions have been discarded with remarkable
ease in the majority of East European states, the legacy that appears to be the most
difficult to overcome is attitudinal rather than institutional or structural” (p. 291). He
further noted that political apathy of the population in post-communist societies coupled
with low levels of political sophistication and general withdrawal from politics has
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created a backward political culture in the whole region. As Bermeo (1994) noted in this
regard, “communism left behind a distrustful, nondemocratic civil society” (p. 160). In a
similar vein, Konrad (cited in Barany (1995) wrote, “What will remain of socialism? All
these socialist realist people. They are socialists because they have lived with the socialist
reality for forty years; the majority for most of their lives. The lessons, traits, style,
morality, and logic of these forty years cannot be dropped in the waste basket” (p. 177).
In acknowledging the persistence of historic legacies, Rose (2009) noted that “the
experience of being socialized into a totalitarian regime could last a lifetime” (p. 19).
Although few empirical studies have evaluated the above-stated claims, there is
growing evidence that historical legacies have far-ranging consequences on various
aspects of institutional and personal well-being. For example, Dimitrova-Grajzl and
Simon (2010) studied how the legacy of past regimes affected the level of political and
interpersonal trust among young people in post-communist societies and in established
democracies. Specifically, they examined how different types of communist regimes
affected the degree to which young people in transitioning states placed trust in political
institutions and in other people. The study tested the main proposition that more
restrictive regimes will have a negative impact on trust displayed by young people in
respective societies in comparison with regimes that allowed for some freedoms. Four
types of communist legacies were included in the analyses (a) accommodative, (b)
bureaucratic, (c) patrimonial, and (d) Yugoslav legacy. An important premise of their
study is a consideration of trust as a “slow-moving institution” that is rooted in cultural
norms and societal values that are transmitted from generation to generation.
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In general, results supported the hypothesized relationship by showing that the
legacy of socialist regime in all transitioning states led to lower trust in political
institutions in comparison with states with no experience of socialist regime. In addition,
the study partially supported the hypothesis that different types of socialist regimes
affected trust to varying degrees. Thus respondents from states with legacies of
patrimonial socialism had lower trust than respondents from accommodative socialism
regimes. Interestingly, former Yugoslavian regimes were documented to have a larger
negative effect on trust in comparison with other types of socialist regime. However,
other varieties of socialism were not significantly different from each other in their
influence on trust among younger populations. In sum, the study revealed that young
people from former patrimonial socialist regimes displayed the lowest levels of trust,
followed by people in former bureaucratic regimes. Young adults from states with the
legacy of accommodative socialist regime had the highest level of trust among all other
states but lower than their counterparts from Western democracies. Overall, the study
documented heterogeneous impact of socialism on trust among people from postcommunist societies and reiterated the importance of including historical legacies in
analyses of democratically relevant attitudes. Moreover, the study further confirmed the
significance of differentiating between different regime types.
To sum, although voluminous literature described the role of historic legacies on
socio-political developments within a society or across regions, less commonly examined
are the effects of different legacies on citizens’ values and beliefs, especially among
younger generations. In the context of post-communist states, information is especially
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scarce about the impact of historical legacies on young people who grew up without a
direct experience of the communist regime (for exceptions see Dimitrova-Grajzl &
Simon, 2010).
Democratic Institutions and Democratic Citizen Orientation
An alternative approach to analyzing factors influencing democratic citizen
orientation deals with more immediate conditions of democratic infrastructure rather than
deeply-rooted cultural norms or historical memory. According to the supporters of this
approach, institutional characteristics of contemporary democratic institutions can
promote or impede public endorsement of democratic orientation (for example, Anderson
& Guillory, 2003; Norris, 1999). A general assumption of institutional theories of
democratic support is that public perception of the effectiveness of democratic
functioning is key to favorable opinions about democracy (Mishler & Rose, 2001). In
other words, the sources of favorable opinions on issues relevant to democracy are found
within democratic performance itself, rather than in outside forces.
The overarching question guiding research on institutional determinants of public
support for democratic principles can be phrased in the following way: Which
institutional characteristics can impact the way individuals view democratic principles
and ideas? Different scholars provided different explanations to this question. For
example, Inglehart (1997) linked favorable economic conditions with better democratic
functioning and higher support for democratic values. Norris (1999) used Freedom House
rating scores to show that trust, an important component of democratic citizen
orientation, is higher in states with better records of respect of political rights and
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liberties than in states that score lower on measures of respect of political rights and
liberties. Similarly, Anderson and Tverdova (2003) documented a negative correlation
between the level of corruption in society and citizens’ trust. This finding suggests that
public endorsement of specific elements of democratic citizen orientation influences and
is being influenced by individuals’ perceptions of the fairness of relevant societal
institutions.
At the same time, despite the fact that support for democracy appears at the core
of political science research, studies investigating the relationship between citizens’
support for democracy in a broad sense and democratic functioning are relatively new.
For many years, noticeably absent from the majority of theoretical inquiries and practical
interventions has been reliable evidence on what people actually think about different
aspects of democratic society and how such views vary across generations and across
different regions of the world (Mattes, 2010). Especially scarce such information is with
regard to states that are moving toward democratic consolidation. In concluding remarks
to his presentation “How People View Democracy: Findings from Public Opinion
Surveys in Four Regions,” Diamond (2001) noted, “despite the extraordinary outporing
of data over the past decade, the comparative study of how mass publics in emerging
democracies view and value their institutions is only now emerging into a more mature
phase” (p. 19).
In sum, according to institutional approaches, individuals display varying levels
of endorsement of democratic orientation based on the context in which democratic
institutions function. The specifics and direction of such institutional effects are not clear,
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however. Thus, no consensus has been established in terms of concrete features of
institutional design that might foster democratic citizen orientation. Moreover, no
research has established causal relationship between democratic functioning and
democratic citizen orientation. That is, it is not yet known whether favorable democratic
functioning causes people to value democracy and its principles or whether people’s
appreciation of a democratic way of life leads to democratic advancement.
Summary
Summarizing findings from selected studies reviewed in the sections above, it can
be stated that a variety of theoretical and empirical approaches have established the
importance of studying democratically relevant attitudes and behaviors and advanced our
understanding of how these phenomena might contribute to democracy promotion and
consolidation. In general, research on democratic citizen orientation has focused on
several core areas: (a) different aspects of democratic orientations and how to measure
them, (b) implications of democratically-oriented citizenry for a country’s political,
social, and economic development, (c) comparisons of behavior patterns between prodemocratically oriented citizens and those who are less democratically inclined, and (d)
historical and institutional influences on democratic citizen orientation. While some areas
have received considerable attention from scholars interested in democratic orientation,
other areas have been understudied. For example, a great deal of research on democratic
focuses on the relationship between democratic functioning and support for democratic
governance or seeks to understand how various country characteristics, such as political
regimes or economic prosperity, influence democratic attitudes. At the same time, very
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little systematic research has examined the relationship between democratic orientation
and democracy at the societal level (exceptions, see Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel,
2006)
In addition, the literature on adherence to democratic principles and norms lacks a
comprehensive examination of cross-cultural variation in democratic orientations among
youth. Many theoretical inquires that have shaped a significant amount of research
dedicated to the study of transitioning societies have primarily been tested among adult
populations in emerging democracies. However, few studies have examined relevant
attitudes, values, and beliefs among younger populations in transitioning societies. Even
less common are comparative analyses of such attitudes among youths from societies in
different stages of democratic transformation.
Thus, the identified gaps in the literature raise the following questions: What
factors best describe adolescents’ democratic orientation? How do these factors relate to
adolescents’ countries of origin? How are democratic orientations distributed among
adolescents in emerging and established democracies? How can we explain the
differences found across and within countries? And, finally, does adolescents’ democratic
orientation matter for a country’s long-term democratic outlook? These are the main
questions guiding this dissertation. The Chapter that follows outlines the specific research
questions and anticipated hypotheses and describes the data and the methodology that are
used to address these inquiries.
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CHAPTER THREE
DATA AND METHODS
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Although there are many expectations and predictions made in regard to aspiring
and established democracies, there is a lack of research to guide practical interventions
that might foster democratic development (Dalton, 2004; Print, 2007; Putnam, 2000;
Sloam, 2007; Stewart, 2009a, 2009b; Tessler & Gao, 2009). Additionally, many gaps
remain in the literature on the nature of democratic orientation among the general public.
For example, some important aspects of democratic citizen orientation, including
developmental and cultural determinants of pro-democratic attitudes, have been neglected
(Mattes, 2010). Consensus is also yet to be established on the relationship between
historical factors and the degree to which populations endorse democratic values and the
degree to which institutional characteristics influence democratic beliefs (Mishler &
Rose, 2001, 2005). Finally, there is a lack of research on democratic attitudes and public
support for democratic values beyond those that explicitly mention the most basic
elements of a democratic system (Inglehart, 2003). Especially scarce is information about
democratic orientations among younger generations.
The present dissertation addresses these gaps by providing information on the
democratic orientations of adolescents from states with varying economic, political, and
social situations. The main goal of this dissertation is to describe and analyze democratic
orientations among adolescents from aspiring and established democracies. Specifically,
the dissertation compares how adolescents’ democratic attitudes differ based on the
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historical legacies of the countries in which they reside and based on the quality of
democratic institutions within their countries.
This research was conducted in two stages. In the first stage a number of analyses
were carried out to prepare the dataset for statistical tests. Specifically, questions related
to the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation as well as reliability of
derived measures were explored.
The main research questions were addressed in the second stage. To organize
statistical analyses and help with the interpretation of findings, research questions and
hypotheses were subdivided into three sections. Section one describes how adolescents in
aspiring and established democracies differ in terms of their democratic worldview.
Section two examines the impact of historical legacies and the quality of contemporary
democratic institutions on each of the identified factors of adolescents’ democratic
orientation. Finally, section three explores the relationship between adolescents’
democratic orientation and their intentions to participate in social and political activities
upon reaching adulthood.
Stage I: Dataset Preparation
Research Questions:
1. Are the scales that were developed for the primary analysis of ICCS data reliable
tools for assessing democratic orientations among adolescents from selected
countries?
2. What is the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation?
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Stage II: Hypotheses Testing
Section 1: Describing differences in adolescents’ democratic orientations
Research Question 1:
How do democratic orientations compare among adolescents from different
countries?
Hypothesis 1:
There are significant differences in democratic orientations among adolescents
from different countries.
Research Question 2:
Are there significant differences in democratic orientations between adolescents
in aspiring and established democracies?
Hypothesis 2:
There are significant differences among adolescents from aspiring and established
democracies in terms of their democratic orientations.
Section 2: Examining variation in adolescents’ democratic orientations
Research Question 1:
What is the relationship between a country’s history of democratic tradition and
adolescents’ democratic orientation?
Hypothesis 1:
There is a significant positive relationship between a country’s history of
democratic tradition and adolescents’ democratic orientation.
Research Question 2:
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What is the relationship between a country’s history of communism and
adolescents’ democratic orientation?
Hypothesis 2:
There is a significant negative relationship between a country’s history of
communism and adolescents’ democratic orientations.
Research Question 3:
To what extent are there significant differences in adolescents’ democratic
orientation related to historical legacy?
Hypothesis 3:
Historical legacies impact adolescents’ democratic orientation differently.
Hypothesis 3a:
Adolescents in states with a Patrimonial communist legacy will have lower levels
of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with a Bureaucratic or an
Accommodative communist legacies.
Hypothesis 3b:
Adolescents in states with a Bureaucratic communist legacy will have lower
levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with an
Accommodative communist legacy.
Hypothesis 3c:
Adolescents in states with an Accommodative communist legacy will have lower
levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with a legacy of
democratic tradition.
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Research Question 4:
What is the relationship between adolescents’ democratic orientation and the
quality of democratic institutions in their societies?
Hypothesis 4:
There is a positive relationship between the quality of democratic institutions and
adolescents’ democratic orientation.
Research Question 5:
Is historical legacy or the quality of current democratic institutions more
important in determining adolescents’ democratic orientation?
Hypothesis 5:
Historical legacy is more important in determining adolescents’ democratic
orientation than the current quality of democratic institutions of their countries.
Section 3: Exploring the potential consequences of democratic orientations
Research Question 1:
To what extent does each dimension of adolescents’ democratic orientation
predict their intentions to participate in future social and political activities?
Hypothesis 1:
The higher the level of democratic orientation among adolescents, the higher their
intentions with regard to participation in future social and political activities.
Bonus Research
Bonus Research Question: Can adolescents be classified into distinct groups based on
their democratic orientation?
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Hypothesis: Adolescents can be classified into distinct groups based on their democratic
orientation.
Data Sources
To answer research questions and test the posed hypotheses, data at different
levels are needed. Specifically, exploring the nature of democratic orientation among
adolescents requires individual-level data on values, beliefs, and behavioral intentions.
The main data source was the International Civic and Citizenship Study (2009). In turn,
assessing country-level correlates of adolescents’ democratic orientations requires
aggregate measures of historical legacies and measures of the quality of democratic
institutions. The Quality of Democracy Index, a measure of the Quality of Democracy
project was used to measure the quality of democratic institutions. To measure historical
legacy, a modified version of Kitschelt’s (1995) typology of communist regimes was
used.
Background on the IEA Civic Education Studies
Established in 1958 as a consortium of educational and social science research
institutes, the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
(IEA) has been conducting studies of civic knowledge among adolescents from different
countries since the early 1970s. The first study took place in 1971 and tested about
32,000 students from nine countries. The second wave of the study, known as the IEA
Civic Education Study (CIVED), was initiated in the late 1990s and expanded its pool of
international participants to include 90,000 students from 28 countries in different regions
of the world. The International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) presents

74

the third wave of a large-scale IEA initiative and is the largest international study to date
to explore civic knowledge and attitudes of secondary school students in an international
setting. Conducted in 2009, the ICCS gathered data from more than 140,000 adolescents
in over 5,300 schools from 38 states in Europe, Asia, South America, and other parts of
the world. The ICCS 2009 target population was students in the eighth grade or an
equivalent grade that represents eight years of schooling. The average age of students in
the 8th grade or equivalent was 13.5 years. Original datasets contained data for over 3000
students selected at random in approximately 150 schools in each country (Schulz,
Fraillon, Ainley, & Van de Gaer, 2011).
Rigorous design of these multi-phase research initiatives and availability of data
comparable across cultures and, in some, cases, between different points of time, has
attracted much scholarly interest. Researchers from a variety of academic disciplines,
including civic education scholars, political scientists, psychologists, and country
specialists have analyzed IEA data from civic education studies (for example, Amadeo,
Torney-Purta, Lehman, Husfeldt, & Nikolova, 2002; Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Schulz &
Sibberns, 2004; Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010).
This dissertation utilizes data from the most recent study, conducted in 2009. The
ICCS International Database offers researchers and analysts a rich environment for
examining student achievement in civic knowledge across nations. Rooted in the
concepts of ecological theory of human developments, the ICCS is provides a coherent
framework for analyzing adolescents’ civic knowledge and covers a wide range of topics
relevant for the study of democratic attitudes. The dataset contains data that are
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segregated into separate parts, according to each of the many aspects of democratic
political culture – from tolerance toward outside groups and gender equality attitudes to
participatory aspirations and trust in governmental institutions.
The main goal of the 2009 ICCS parallels those of the previous waves and aims to
examine young people’s attitudes and beliefs about society as well as their expectations
for undertaking citizenship roles and responsibilities in the future. In general, six broad
research themes are studied: (a) variations in civic knowledge across cultures; (b)
changes in civic knowledge since 1999; (c) students’ interest in engaging in public and
political life and their disposition to do so; (d) perceptions of threats to democracy and
civil society; (e) features of education systems, schools, and classrooms related to civic
and citizenship education; and (f) aspects of students’ backgrounds related to the
outcomes of civic and citizenship education.
Although ICCS builds on previous IEA studies of civic knowledge, there are a
number of unique features that were introduced for the first time during this third wave.
One such feature is the inclusion of regional modules in the design of questionnaires and
other research instruments. Thus three regional modules - Asian, European, and Latin
American, were developed to assess specific regional characteristics in the spheres of
civic and citizenship education in 38 countries.
The ICCS design is structured around three main dimensions (a) content
dimension that details the subject matter within civics and citizenship domain, (b)
affective-behavioral dimension that measures students’ perceptions and activities, and (c)
cognitive dimension that describes the thinking process (Schulz, Fraillon, Ainley, Losito,

76

& Kerr, 2008). Each dimension is further subdivided into smaller sub-domains, that in
turn consist of one or more aspects. This dissertation focuses on the affective-behavioral
dimension consisting of value beliefs, attitudes, behavioral intentions, and behaviors
within the context of civics and citizenship. The rationale for focusing on the selected
attitudes is their conceptual relevance to the study of democratic values and beliefs.
The ICCS study utilized a randomized trial design that included not only
adolescents but also teachers and school principles. A variety of methods were used to
collect data, including a self-reported questionnaire with multiple choice items, right and
wrong answers, and attitudinal scaled questions without right or wrong answers. Two
types of instruments were developed to gather information from participating students.
One is a student test that measures civic and citizenship knowledge and understanding of
basic concepts. The other instrument represents a questionnaire that assesses students’
perceptions of ideas, constructs, and behaviors relevant to the civic and citizenship
domains.
Theoretical Framework
A sophisticated theoretical model has been developed to organize, analyze, and
explain information collected for the study (Amadeo et al., 2002; Torney-Purta et al.,
2001). ICCS theoretical framework builds on the CIVED conceptual model and reflects
its major principles. In more detail, the model is based on theories of ecological
development (Bronfenbrenner, 1988) and situated cognition (Lave & Wenger, 1997). By
merging these two theories, the model represents “a visualization of ways in which the
everyday lives of young people in homes, with peers, and at school serve as a ‘nested’
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context for young people’s thinking and action n the social and political environment.”
(Amadeo et al., 2002, p. 21). In addition, separate elements from political socialization
theories (Flanagan & Sherrod, 1998) and research on democracy (Dalton, 2000) along
with relevant theoretical insights from a variety of other disciplines have been integrated
into the model as well. As a result, the IEA comprehensive theoretical framework
virtually presents a model of a civic world where every individual student occupies a
central position and acts as both initiator and recipient of multiple actions within this
world (Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Schulz et al., 2008). Central to this framework is the
assumption that youths learn about civics and citizenship in multiple contexts outside
school and classroom instruction, such as through their interactions with civic players at
different levels.
Three broad domains were selected to guide the research project. They included
democracy, national identity, regional and international relationships, and social cohesion
and diversity. Additionally, a domain related to economics and media and environment
was introduced to test democratic knowledge and civic attitudes among upper secondary
students (Amadeo et al., 2002). Each of the domains contained a number of sub-domains
for a more complete assessment of variables of interest.
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Figure 1: Theoretical Model of the ICCS and CIVED Studies

Source: International Civic and Citizenship Education Study: Assessment framework (Schulz et al., 2008).

Dataset Development
As described above, the International Civic and Citizenship Study is the largest
international study to date that contains information about adolescents’ citizenship
knowledge and civic values, including democratic orientation (Schulz et al., 2010).
Specifically, the ICCS student questionnaire provides individual-level data relevant to
adolescents’ democratic orientation, such as tolerance of outgroups, support for
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democratic values and freedoms, adolescents’ trust in governmental authorities and
others people, and other attitudinal measures.
Although datasets are available for 38 countries, this dissertation limits the
analysis to 20 states that represent established and aspiring democracies. Specifically, this
dissertation focuses on the European module that consists of 24 countries (Kerr, Sturman,
Schulz, & Burge, 2010). The majority of the countries included in the analyses are
European states and members of the European Union with the exception of Norway,
Russia, and Switzerland. In addition to varying degrees of democratic advancement, a
number of indicators at social, political, cultural, and other levels distinguish these
countries and thus provide a rich context for comparing them. Theoretical and practical
reasons guided the selection of countries. The practical considerations included
availability of data at the country level that would enable meaningful comparisons
between different states. The theoretical considerations included regional variations and
system-level characteristics in the socio-political sphere that allow cross-national
comparisons. Additionally, a variety of measures used to assess the state of democracy in
regions across the world utilize a similar approach to classifying countries.
To make the dataset more manageable, sample reduction analysis was carried out.
Specifically, 33% of all cases were randomly selected in each country and the reduced
samples were then pooled together into a single dataset resulting in 21,672 cases to be
analyzed.
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The ICCS Research Variables
The student portion of the ICCS consists of a test of 80 items that assess civic
knowledge and a 121-item student questionnaire that focuses on adolescents’ attitudes
and values in the spheres of citizenship and civic engagement (Schulz et al., 2010). In
more detail, the ICCS student questionnaire consists of a collection of background, civic
knowledge, and attitudinal questions that provide insights into adolescents’ worldview on
issues related to democracy and civil society. As part of the initial analysis of the ICCS
data, several scales were constructed to help assess students’ attitudes in the spheres
outlined above. Altogether, 19 scales were developed to assess students’ attitudes in the
four domains (a) value beliefs, (b) attitudes, (c) behaviors, and d) behavioral intentions.
All scales were constructed with the help of confirmatory factor analysis and item
response theory (IRT) methods. The original scales had a mean of 50 and standard
deviation of 10.
This research utilizes selected attitudinal scaled items that have the most
relevance to research questions prompted by the literature review. In addition, a few
background variables are utilized to supplement the information obtained from scales.
This section describes in detail the variables utilized in this research. Specifically, the
following ICCS variables are described: demographic variables, support for democratic
values, gender equality attitudes, tolerance towards outgroups, participatory orientation,
trust attitudes, attitudes towards one’s country, internal political efficacy, and interest in
social and political issues. In addition, Appendix A provides details about the specific
wording of each instrument.
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Demographic Variables
A number of ICCS questions in the students’ test gathered socio-demographic
information about adolescents. Despite a large number of background variables available
for analysis, this study limits demographic characteristics to two specific measures gender and socioeconomic status. Gender presents a dichotomous variable, with 0
representing male respondents and 1 denoting female respondents. Students’
socioeconomic background was assessed using the reported number of books in the
home. Specifically, the item measuring the variable of interest was phrased in the
following way: “About how many books are there in your home?” (There are usually
about 40 books per metre of shelving. Do not count magazines, newspapers, comic strips
or your schoolbooks.) The answer options included six categories, ranging from 0 to ten
books to more than 500 books. Previous analyses of other IEA studies have utilized this
variable as a measure of socioeconomic status and have consistently found it to be a valid
indicator of family background (Richardson, 2003; Torney-Purta et al., 2001).
Support for Democratic Values
Unlike other democracy-related concepts reviewed in the sections above, support
for democratic values is directly linked to democratic citizen orientation and thus appears
especially pertinent in the study of adolescents’ democratic orientation. Data from the
ICCS contain a number of individual items and scaled measures of students’ attitudes
toward democratic values and principles. Specifically, the student questionnaire
contained nine questions that measured student beliefs about democracy. Items
represented a series of statements about what a democratic society should be like.

82

In this research, support for democratic values was assessed using a scaled
measure of five items. Some statements included in the scale were phrased in the
following way: “Everyone should always have the right to express their opinions freely”;
“All people should have their social and political rights respected”; “All citizens should
have the rights to elect their leaders freely,” and others (see Appendix A for a complete
list of questions). Students were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with each
of the items using a four-point Likert-type scale, where 1 denoted strong agreement and 4
indicated strong disagreement. Higher scores on the scale reflect greater endorsement of
basic democratic values. The scale demonstrated acceptable internal consistency both in
relation to individual countries and with regard to the average international sample.
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the international ICCS sample was 0.65 and ranged
from 0.56 to 0.78 for individual countries.
Gender Equality Attitudes
A portion of the ICCS assessment framework focused on equal rights attitudes,
including gender equality beliefs. Seven questions about the role of men and women in
society and their rights were included in the questionnaire. Sample issues included the
following phrases: “Men and women should get equal pay when they are doing the same
jobs”; “Men and women should have equal opportunities to take part in government”;
“Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women,” and others (see Appendix
A for a complete list of questions). Students rated their agreement with each of the
statements on a four-point Likert-type scale, where 1 indicated strong agreement and 4
strong disagreement.
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Confirmatory factor analysis revealed a one factor solution with six items grouped
together into a scale of adolescents’ support for equal gender rights and responsibilities.
The scale demonstrated high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha .79) for the ICCS
pooled international sample. ICCS country reliability coefficients ranged from .67 in
Russia to .87 in Finland. Higher scores on the scale indicate greater endorsement of
gender equality rights.
Tolerance toward Outgroups
Two separate scales measured adolescents’ attitudes toward minority groups (a)
tolerance toward immigrants, and (b) tolerance toward ethnic groups. Both are described
in detail in the sections below.
Tolerance toward immigrants. Five statements about immigrants were used to
construct a scale assessing adolescents’ attitudes towards this group. Sample items in this
scale included the following: “Immigrants should have the opportunity to continue
speaking their own language”; “Immigrant children should have the same opportunities
for education that other children in the country have”; “Immigrants should have all the
same rights that everyone else in the country has,” and others (see Appendix A for a
complete list of questions). Students were asked to rate the degree to which they agree
with each of the statement on a 4-point Likert-type scale, where 1 indicated strong
agreement and 4 strong disagreement. Reliability statistics of the instrument showed it
was a reliable measure of adolescents attitudes toward immigrants, with reliability
coefficients ranging from .89 to .50 in individual countries. Cronbach’s alpha for the
ICCS pooled international sample was .80.
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Tolerance toward ethnic groups. Another measure of adolescents’ attitudes
toward minority groups dealt with students’ views on the rights and opportunities
available for ethnic and racial groups in their societies. Sample statements developed for
this purpose included: “All ethnic/ racial groups should have an equal chance to get a
good education in <country of test>”; “Schools should teach students to respect members
of all ethnic/ racial groups,” and others (see Appendix A for a complete list of questions).
Students rated their agreement with each of the five statements, further used for the scale
construction, using a 4-point Likert-type. The instrument demonstrated high internal
consistency for the ICCS international pooled sample and individual countries, with alpha
coefficients of .83 and up to .91, respectively.
Participatory Orientation
The ICCS study included 12 items that were designed to measure adolescents’
opinions about importance of different forms of citizen participation. Results of initial
confirmatory factor analyses suggested a two-factor structure of students perceptions of
citizen participation. Thus two scales were developed to assess these perceptions (a)
support for conventional citizenship participation, and (b) support for social movement
citizen participation.
Support for conventional citizen participation. This scale consists of six items
that include statements about different kinds of conventional citizen participation.
Students were asked to indicate their perceptions of importance of each form of
participation/ behaviors using a 4-point Likert-type scale, where 1 stood for “very
important” and “4” denoted “not important at all.” The question was phrased in the
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following way: “How important are the following behaviors for being a good adult
citizen?” Sample behaviors ranged from following political news and engaging in
political discussions to voting in national elections and joining a political party. The scale
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha of .71 for the
ICCS pooled international sample and up to .77 for individual states.
Support for social movement citizen participation. Questions that measured
adolescents’ appreciation for social movement citizen participation dealt with less
traditional forms of citizen involvement, such as participating in activities that focus on
benefiting local communities, protecting environment, or promoting human rights (see
Appendix A for a complete list of questions). Altogether, four items were included in the
scale. The scale appeared a reliable measure for the ICCS international sample
(Cronbach’s alpha = .74). Reliability coefficients for individual countries ranged from .51
to .81.
Trust Attitudes
As part of assessing adolescents’ civic value beliefs and attitudes pertaining to the
affective-behavioral domain, the ICCS included the measurement of trust in political and
civic institutions. The student questionnaire contained a number of items used to assess
students’ confidence in civic and political institutions in their country. These items
consisted of a series of questions about various institutions in a country of test, such as
courts, the national government, political parties, police, and others. Students were asked
to indicate the degree to which they trust each of these institutions. A Likert-type
responses with four categories were used to get this information. Responses ranged from

86

1 –completely trust to 4 – not at all trust. Out of 14 items available for analysis, six
questions were scaled to assess students’ trust in governmental and related institutions.
The scale demonstrated high internal consistency for the ICCS pooled international
sample, with Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82. Reliability coefficients for individual countries
ranged from 0.78 in Latvia to 0.89 in Sweden.
Similar to other scaled measures, the Rasch Partial Credit Model was used for
creating a scale of trust in civic institutions. As a result, a scale with a mean of 50 and a
standard deviation of 10 was developed for all equally weighted ICCS national samples
(Brese, Jung, Mirazchiyski, Schulz, & Zuehlke, 2011). The higher values on this scale
denote greater levels of trust placed in civic and political institutions. It is important to
note that although scale scores could be interpreted in terms of comparing individual or
group scores with each other or with the ICCS average, the individual scores do not
reveal any information about the item responses per se. Thus, it is impossible to use the
obtained score for evaluating the extent to which respondents endorsed each particular
item that comprised the scale.
Attitudes towards One’s Country
The ICCS instrument contained a series of items to explore how students feel
about their countries. Out of eight items originally developed to measure students’
attitudes towards their countries, seven were used to form a scale. The scale contained
statements about students’ pride in the past and present achievement of their countries,
respect towards state symbols, and perceived effectiveness of state institutions (see
Appendix A for a complete list of questions). Students’ rated their agreement with each
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of the statement using a four-point Likert-type scale, where 1 indicated strong agreement
and 4 denoted strong disagreement. The psychometric information obtained for this scale
showed that it was a reliable tool for analyzing student data from both the ICCS
international pooled sample and individual states, with Cronbach’s alpha coefficients
of .82 and up to .88, respectively.
Internal Political Efficacy
Assessment of adolescents’ internal political efficacy was made using a 6-item
scale. Sample items for this scale included the following phrases: “I know more about
politics than most people of my age”; “I am able to understand political issues easily”;
“When political issues or problems are discussed, I usually have something to say,” and
others (see Appendix A for a complete list of questions). Students were asked to rate their
agreement with each statement on a four-point Likert-type scale as described above.
Higher scores indicate that students feel that they are knowledgeable about politics and
that they have rather high internal political efficacy. On the other hand, lower scores
indicate generally low or no interest in politics and that students do not feel that they
know more about political issues than their peers. This scale demonstrated high internal
consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of .84 for the ICCS international sample
and up to .89 for individual states. Analysis of individual countries also demonstrated
good model fit and satisfactory factor loadings for the scale.
Interest in Social and Political Issues
Out of seven items developed to measure adolescents’ interest in social and
political issues, national and international in scope, five were used to construct a scale of
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such attitudes. All items had a common beginning and started in the following way:
“How interested are you in the following issues?” Students were presented with a series
of issues, such as political and social issues in the country of test and political issues in
other countries, and indicated their level of interest in each of the issues on a 4-point
Likert-type scale, where 1 denoted “very interested” and 4 “not interested at all” (see
Appendix A for a complete list of questions). The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of this
scale was .86 for the ICCS international sample and ranged from .75 to .92 for different
countries.
The Quality of Democracy Index
In investigating the course of democratic developments and, most importantly,
people’s responses to democratization processes, understanding the nature and
characteristics of each democratic system is critical. Although most societies in this
research formally fall under the category of democratic states, assessing the state of
democracy in these countries requires information not only about the presence of
democratic institutions but also about the character and quality of democratic institutions.
As the literature review demonstrated, there are many measurements of
democracy and democratic attitudes but no consensus has been achieved in terms of the
best indicator of a country’s democratic development. This research utilizes the
Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy that evaluates countries’ democratic
progress based on the quality of their democracy. First introduced by Campbell (2008),
the Quality of Democracy index emphasizes the importance of measuring democracy
within the context of society and integrates a number of societal characteristics in its
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assessment framework. Specifically, six dimensions are included in the index: (a)
political system, (b) gender, (c) economy, (d) knowledge, (e) health, and (f) the
environment. Each of the dimensions is assigned a score and a weight measure and then
aggregated into an average score. Of note, the political dimension accounts for 50% of
the total score. Thus the Democracy Ranking presents a multidimensional measure that
focuses not only on the performance of democratic institutions in the political system but
also on the performance of non-political dimensions that represent different domains of
society. By applying such a comprehensive framework, the Democracy Ranking adopts a
broad definition of democracy. The conceptual framework for this is expressed in the
following formula:
Quality of Democracy = (freedom and other characteristics of the political
system) + (performance of non-political dimensions)13.

13

According to Campbell (2008), the rationale for adopting such a broad framework is that takes into
different domains of people’s lives that are not typically included in traditional measures of democracy. In
Campbell’s own words: Without reflecting on the quality of society, there cannot be a sufficient
comprehension of the context for the quality of politics. And the quality of society clearly colors the quality
of the life of individuals and of communities within that society” (p. 35).
.
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Figure 2: The Quality of Democratic Institutions by Country
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Historical Legacies Categories
To measure historical legacy, two categorical groupings have been adopted:
aspiring democracies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Russia) and established democracies (Austria, Belgium
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland). This simplified classification mainly aims to distinguish between
democratic orientations of adolescents in aspiring and established democracies. Of note, a
number of measures that assess the state of democracy in regions across the world utilize
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a similar approach to classifying countries (for example, Freedom in the World analytical
reports compiled by Freedom House).
The categorical groupings of countries into established and aspiring democracies
are further subdivided into four legacy types based on the nature of the previous
communist regime. Countries are placed in the following types of historical legacy: (a)
accommodative, (b) bureaucratic, (c) patrimonial, and (d) democratic tradition. Table 1
summarizes these categories. The categories were adopted based on Dimitrova-Grajzl
and Simon’s (2010) classification of communist legacies. This study utilizes this
classification to measure democratic orientation rather than other suggested typologies of
communist legacies due to the following reasons. First, it accounts for political structures
of the past plus some aspects of social and economic reality during the communist period.
Secondly, it assumes that national conditions varied not only during the communist
regime but also prior to its establishment. Thus it also takes into account pre-communist
legacies. This classification was discussed in more detailed in the Literature Review in
the section on Post-communist Legacies.
Table 1: Classification of Historical Legacies
Legacy type

Countries

Accommodative communist legacy

Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Estonia, Poland

Bureaucratic communist legacy

Czech Republic, Slovak Republic

Patrimonial communist legacy

Bulgaria, Russia

Democratic tradition

Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Belgium
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Methods of Analysis
This research was based on quantitative analysis of secondary data from sources
described in detail above. Two analytical programs were used to perform statistical
procedures - the 18th version of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for
Windows and an add-on module for SPSS Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS). The
data analyses were carried out in two stages: (a) dataset preparation and (b) hypothesis
testing. In the first stage, reliability and principal component analyses (PCA) were
conducted for the purpose of establishing psychometric properties of the variables and to
identify underlying dimensions, or components, in adolescents’ democratic orientation.
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was carried out to confirm that the identified model
presents a good fit for data from selected ICCS countries.
The second stage included descriptive statistics that provided descriptions of
adolescents’ democratic orientation and a number of inferential statistical analyses, such
as correlation analyses, t-tests, analyses of variance (ANOVA), and hierarchical
regressions that addressed the main research questions. Table 2 summarizes research
questions, hypotheses, and the statistical analyses that were used in this research.
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Table 2: Research Questions and Statistical Analyses
Stage,
Section
Stage I

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Statistical
Analyses
RQ1: Are the scales that were developed for the primary
Reliability
analysis of ICCS data reliable tools for assessing democratic analysis
orientations of adolescents from selected countries?
RQ2: What is the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic
orientation?
Is the model that proposes a three-component structure of
adolescents’ democratic orientation a good fit for data from
selected ICCS countries?

Principal
component
analysis
Confirmatory
factor analysis

Stage II,
Section 1

RQ1: How do adolescents’ democratic orientations compare
among different countries?

Research Variables
Support for democratic values
Gender equality attitudes
Equal rights for ethnic minorities
Equal rights for immigrants
Conventional citizenship
Social movement citizenship
Interest in politics and social
issues
Internal political efficacy
Institutional trust
Attitudes towards one’s country

Descriptive
statistics

H1: There are significant differences in democratic
orientations among adolescents from different countries.
ANOVA
T-test,
Descriptive
statistics

RQ2: Are there differences in democratic orientations
between adolescents in aspiring and established
democracies?
H2: There are significant differences among adolescents
from aspiring and established democracies in terms of their
democratic orientations.
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Dependent variables:
Civil liberties
Engagement
Trust
Independent variable:
Type of democratic advancement

Stage II,
Section 2

RQ1: What is the relationship between a country’s history of
democratic tradition and adolescents’ democratic
orientation?
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between a
country’s history of democratic tradition and adolescents’
democratic orientation.

Correlations,
Descriptive
statistics
ANOVA
posthoc tests

RQ2: What is the relationship between a country’s history of Correlations,
communism and adolescents’ democratic orientation?
descriptive
statistics
H2: There is a negative relationship between a country’s
history of communism and adolescents’ democratic
orientation.
RQ3: To what extent are there significant differences in
adolescents’ democratic attitudes related to historical
legacy?
H3: Historical legacies impact adolescents’ democratic
orientation differently.
H3a: Adolescents in states with Patrimonial communist
legacy will have lower levels of democratic orientation than
adolescents in states with Bureaucratic and Accommodative
communist legacies.
H3b: Adolescents in states with Bureaucratic communist
legacy will have lower levels of democratic orientation than
adolescents in states with Accommodative communist
legacy.
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Dependent variables:
Civil liberties
Engagement
Trust
Independent variable:
Type of historical legacy

H3c: Adolescents in states with Accommodative communist
legacy will have lower levels of democratic orientation than
adolescents in states with a legacy of democratic tradition.
RQ4:What is the relationship between adolescents’
democratic orientation and the current quality of democratic
institutions in their societies?
H4: There is a positive relationship between the current
quality of democratic institutions and adolescents’
democratic orientation.
RQ5: Is historical legacy or the quality of current
democratic institution more important in determining
adolescents’ democratic orientations?

Stage II,
Section 3

H5: Historical legacy is more important in determining
adolescents’ democratic orientation than the current quality
of democratic institutions.
RQ1: To what extent does each dimension of adolescents’
democratic orientation predict their intentions to participate
in future social and political activities?
H1: The higher the level of democratic orientation among
adolescents, the higher their intentions with regard to
participation in future social and political activities.
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Correlations,
descriptive
statistics

Dependent variables:
Civil liberties
Engagement
Trust
Independent variable:
Quality of democracy

MANOVA

Dependent variables:
Civil liberties
Engagement
Trust
Independent variable:
Quality of democracy
Type of historical legacy
Dependent variables:
Expected participation in:
- legal protest
in illegal protest
elections
formal political activities
informal activities
Independent variables:
Civil liberties
Engagement
Trust
Control Variables:
Gender
Home literacy resources

Hierarchical
regressions

Bonus
research

RQ1: Can adolescents be classified into distinct groups
based on their democratic orientation?

Discriminant
function analysis

H: Adolescents can be classified into distinct groups based
on their democratic orientation.
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Dependent variable:
Type of historical legacy
Independent variables:
Support for democratic
values
Gender equality attitudes
Equal rights for ethnic
minorities
Equal rights for
immigrants
Interest in politics and
social issues
Internal political efficacy
Institutional trust

CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS
Stage I: Dataset Preparation
Prior to running specific analyses to address the research questions and test the
relationships hypothesized in this study, several transformations were made to ensure the
dataset met the necessary criteria for carrying out statistical procedures. Specifically, the
transformations included cleaning the data, addressing missing values issues, reviewing
correlation coefficients, calculating reliability statistics, and developing new scales.
The total number of observations is 21,672, drawn from 20 countries. Descriptive
statistics and correlation matrices were generated as a basis for other statistic procedures.
The results are presented in Appendix B.
Reliability Statistics for the ICCS Scales
Research Question 1: Are the scales that were developed for the primary analysis of
ICCS data reliable tools for assessing democratic orientations among adolescents
from selected countries?
Because this study utilized data from selected countries and because only a
portion of all available cases were randomly chosen to create a single dataset, a series of
reliability analyses were conducted to ensure that the scales that were originally
developed for the analysis of ICCS data also provide accurate measures of the concepts
of interest. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were calculated for 10 scales for the pooled
sample and for individual countries. Results from the pooled sample are summarized in
Table 3 below.
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Table 3: Descriptive and Reliability Statistics for Research Variables
Research variable

Number of

Cronbach’s

items

Alpha
(pooled sample)

Support for democratic values

5

.66

Gender equality attitudes

6

.64

Tolerance toward immigrants

5

.79

Tolerance toward ethnic groups

5

.84

Support for conventional citizen participation

6

.71

Support for social-movement citizen

4

.75

Interest in social and political issues

5

.87

Internal political efficacy

6

.85

Trust attitudes

6

.84

Attitudes towards one’s country

7

.82

participation

Exploratory Factor Analyses
Research Question 2: What is the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation?
To answer the question about the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic
orientation, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted. An exploratory factor analysis
has three main functions: (a) to explore the structure of a set of variables, (b) to develop a
measure of a latent variable, and (c) to reduce a data set to a more manageable size by
combining variables into specific factors (Fields, 2005). Previous theoretical research and
empirical studies of democratic citizen orientation, reviewed in detail in Chapter 2,
suggest that democratically oriented citizens possess a variety of characteristics,
including support for basic democratic values, trust in other people and government
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institutions, willingness to participate in social and political activities. Consensus about
the accuracy and reliability of different measures of democratic beliefs remains to be
achieved. In a similar vein, no agreement exists about the relationship among these
variables. In light of the above, it is justifiable to expect that combining some of the items
available from the ICCS study might produce measures of the latent dimensions of
democratic citizen orientation, operationalized in this research as a set of attitudes and
behavioral intentions conducive to democratic advancement.
Goodness of Fit
Several analytical procedures necessary to ensure the goodness of fit were
conducted prior to testing the latent structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation.
First, to ensure a stable factor solution it is important to consider the sample size.
Opinions with regard to an optimal sample size for a reliable factor analysis vary. Thus,
some have argued that having 10-15 participants per variable is a necessary condition to
ensure adequate test parameters (for example, Kass & Tinsley, 1979; Nunnally, 1978;
Fields, 2005). Others have proposed a sample size of at least 300 cases for carrying out
factor analysis (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001). MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, and Hing
(1999) indicated that determining an adequate sample size for factor analysis depends not
only on the number of variables but also on the value of communalities. In more detail,
they established that lower values of communality factor requires larger sample size.
Furthermore, Guadagnoli and Velicer (cited in Fields, 2005) argued that a factor with
four or more loadings with values .6 or higher is reliable regardless of a sample size.
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Finally, another way to ensure sampling adequacy is to use the Kaiser-MeyerOlkin measure (KMO). The KMO statistics ranges from zero to one and represents “the
ratio of the squared correlation between variables to the squared partial correlation
between variables” (Fields, 2005, p. 640). In other words, a KMO value indicates
whether a factor solution can be considered appropriate given a specific sample size. In
general, lower KMO values suggest that there might be a problem with either a number
of cases available for analysis or that the variables selected for factor analysis should be
reconsidered. More specifically, values higher than .5 are considered barely acceptable,
values between .5 and .7 are mediocre, values between .7 and .8 are good and values
above .9 are great.
Secondly, an important consideration that ensures a reliable factor analysis deals
with intercorrelation between variables. Generally, variables that do not correlate with
each other as well as variables that correlate too highly (R < .9) are excluded from factor
analysis. To ensure that the variables selected for the analysis satisfy necessary
conditions, a bivariate correlation matrix of all variables was created (see Appendix B for
correlation coefficients). Thirdly, it is important to ensure that the selected variables
satisfy the assumption of normality.
Principal Component Analysis
Principal component analysis was used to locate underlying dimensions of
adolescents’ democratic orientation. According to Fields (2005), principal component
analysis is a “psychometrically sound procedure” and “less complex than factor analysis”
(p. 631). Direct oblimin rotation, a method of oblique rotation, was used to improve
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interpretation of factor solutions. Theoretical grounds for choosing oblique rotation stem
largely from an argument articulated by Inglehart (2006) who claimed that “people who
support democracy on one indicator, tend to support democracy on the other indicators”
(p. 2003). Although the present analysis of adolescents’ democratic orientation goes
beyond support for democracy as a form of government, it is expected that factors of
adolescents’ democratic mindset will correlate with each other. In addition, some have
argued that data from experiments involving humans should be analyzed via oblique
rotations only (for example, Fields, 2005). The main argument for such claims is that
there are hardly any psychological constructs that are not related to another psychological
construct.
Ten variables were included in the model to explore the relationships among them
and to test the possibility of locating distinct dimensions within adolescents’ democratic
mindset. For a complete list of items that comprised each of the ten variables, see
Appendix A. The items included in the analysis correlated with at least one item at the
level of .30 or above. Correlation coefficients are shown in Table 1 in Appendix B. The
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was .72 demonstrating acceptable sampling adequacy.
Table 4 demonstrates a factor solution that emerged after running the analysis.
Items that express support for democratic values, gender equality attitudes, and tolerance
toward ethnic and immigrant groups load highly on the same factor, which can be
characterized as a civil liberties orientation. Political efficacy, political interest, and
values of conventional and social movement citizenship load on the second factor and
can be considered as a sense of engagement. Finally, trust related variables and items
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indicating adolescents’ attitudes toward their country of origin group together. However,
because two items are not sufficient to define a factor, the third component, although
distinct, cannot be classified as an independent factor. However, due to its conceptual
relevance, it was included in subsequent analyses. In this regard, rather than being
interpreted as two separate items, the two variables were analyzed together by computing
the mean score. Overall, the identified components explained over 59% of the total
variance. Of note, this structure solution is consistent for the international pooled sample
as well as for individual countries.
Table 4: Factor Loadings for Indices Measuring Adolescents’ Democratic
Orientation
Items

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Commun

Civil

Engagement

Trust

alities

liberties
Support for democratic values

.636

.448

Gender equality

.717

.496

Equal rights for ethnic

.780

.657

.747

.565

minorities
Equal rights for immigrants
Conventional citizenship

.599

.577

Social movement citizenship

.442

.419

Interest in politics and social

.843

.704

.849

.675

issues
Internal political efficacy
Trust in institutions

.829

.700

Attitudes towards one’s

.831

.682

country
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In sum, the factor analysis revealed that adolescents’ democratic orientation
presents a three-dimensional pattern of attitudinal and behavioral norms. An initial
examination of items that compose each of the underlying dimensions suggests that the
following factors can describe adolescents’ democratic mindset: (a) civil liberties, (b)
engagement, and (c) trust.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Results obtained from the previous analysis suggest that there are at least two
distinct components in adolescents’ democratic orientation, civil liberties and
engagement. To test how well the identified dimensions fit the data utilized in the current
study, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted.
According to Hu and Bentler (1999) and Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen (2008), the
following indices were used to test the goodness-of-fit proposition: Chi-square (CMIN)
(χ2 > .05), the Goodness-of-Fit statistic (GFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI > .96), and
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA < .05). The results for both models
are reported in Table 5.
As the table demonstrates, the Chi-square statistics for both models were
significant suggesting the models were a poor fit. However, given a number of limitations
associated with the use of this measure, the results should be interpreted with caution.
First, Chi-square statistic has been found to be sensitive to sample size (Bentler &
Bonnet, 1980). Specifically, when large sample sizes are used, as is the case in this study,
the Chi-square test tends to be significant thus rejecting the model. Secondly, the Chisquare test assumes multivariate normality (McIntosh (2006) as cited in Hooper,
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Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). Thus due to restrictiveness of this measure, an alternative
index was used to evaluate the model fit. The GFI values of .95 and above is usually
interpreted as indicating a good model fit (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). As is
shown, the GFI statistics for both models are 1. Additionally, CFI and RMSEA yielded
positive results, demonstrating both models are a good fit for the data.
Table 5: Model Fit Indices for Confirmatory Factor Analyses
Component
(factor)
Civil
liberties
Engagement

χ2

df

p

GFI

CFI

RMSEA

15.61

1

.01

1.00

.99

.03

.53

1

.47

1.00

1.00

.00

Reliability Statistics for Democratic Orientation Measures
Following the confirmatory factor analysis, two scales were created reflecting the
structure of each of the factors. To ensure that a two-factor classification of adolescents’
democratic orientation presents a consistent measure, reliability analyses were conducted
to test psychometric properties of the derived scales. Specifically, Cronbach’s α
coefficients were calculated to examine the extent to which the two scales measured a
specific underlying factor. Results showed that both scales appeared reliable measures of
civil liberties and engagement dimensions of adolescents’ democratic orientations, with
Cronbach’s α of .70 and .72, respectively.
For a more systematic analysis of democratic orientation, the variables associated
with the trust component were grouped together to make a liner additive index. Thus two
scales and one composite measure were created: (a) civil liberties, (b) engagement, and
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(c) trust. The scores computed from each of the measures were then used to examine
variability in democratic attitudes among adolescents across countries as well as to
explore possible explanations for such variation.
Stage II: Hypotheses Testing
Describing Differences in Democratic Orientations
Hypothesis 1: There are significant differences in democratic orientations among
adolescents from different countries.
To answer the question about variation in adolescents’ democratic orientations,
mean scores for each of the three dimensions of democratic orientation were calculated.
Overall, the mean scores for the pooled sample were: 49.60 with a standard deviation of
7.25 for the civil liberties dimension; 48.72 (SD = 7.27) for the engagement dimension;
and 49.8 (SD = 9.55) for the trust dimension. Figures 3 represents average levels of
endorsement of the civil liberties dimensions among adolescents in the 20 countries
analyzed in this research. Figures 4 and 5 present mean scores for the other two aspects
of adolescents’ democratic orientations.
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Figure 3: Average Civil Liberties Score by Country
Latvia
The Netherlands
Russia
Czech Republic
Belgium
Estonia
Slovakia
Bulgaria
Poland
Finland
Lithuania
Slovenia
Italy
Switzerland
Austria
Denmark
Greece
Norway
Spain
Sweden

47.20
47.41
47.42
47.88
48.20
48.77
49.07
49.36
49.57
49.68
49.80
49.99
50.08
50.08
50.09
50.31
50.52
51.62
51.75
52.56

44.00 45.00 46.00 47.00 48.00 49.00 50.00 51.00 52.00 53.00
Mean Civil Liberties Score
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Figure 4: Average Engagement Score by Country
Belgium
Finland
The Netherlands
Czech Republic
Sweden
Slovenia
Slovakia
Denmark
Swetzerland
Estonia
Norway
Austria
Spain
Latvia
Bulgaria
Lithuania
Poland
Greece
Russia
Italy
40.00

45.46
45.51
45.59
46.03
46.59
46.71
46.89
47.27
48.12
48.79
49.22
49.63
49.84
50.03
50.12
50.61
50.62
51.36
51.79
52.88
42.00

44.00

46.00

48.00

Mean Engagement Score
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50.00

52.00

54.00

Figure 5: Average Trust Score by Country
Latvia
Greece
Czech Republic
Belgium
Poland
Lithuania
Slovakia
Estonia
Bulgaria
Spain
The Netherlands
Slovenia
Sweden
Italy
Denmark
Switzelrand
Norway
Austria
Finland
Russia
40.00

43.82
45.57
46.29
46.70
46.75
47.27
48.33
48.36
48.48
48.86
49.04
49.55
50.22
50.35
50.46
51.13
52.19
52.38
52.42
52.69
42.00

44.00

46.00

48.00

50.00

52.00

54.00

Mean Trust Score

As the figures illustrate, there is some variation among countries in terms of
democratic orientation of their younger residents. In general, countries that fall under the
category of established democracy score higher on two of the three examined dimensions
of democratic orientation, trust and civil liberties. At the same time, several outliers are
evident in both scales. For example, Russia stands out with its high score on the trust
dimension and The Netherlands and Belgium appear in the lower end of the civil liberties
distribution. Scores indicating the level of engagement are distributed less uniformly.
Thus there is a wide variation among countries with higher levels of engagement among
adolescents. In other words, established democracies from Western Europe appear at both
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ends of the score distribution. For example, Italy has the highest level of engagement and
Belgium presents the case with the lowest score.
These results indicate that democratic orientation does not present a common
pattern in established and aspiring democracies. Analysis of these country data in a more
systematic way might yield more coherent results. One such way is to explore country
differences utilizing different country categories, such as aspiring versus established
democracies. The following section addresses this issue.
Hypothesis 2: There are significant differences among adolescents from aspiring and
established democracies in terms of their democratic orientations.
A T-test analysis was conducted to find out whether adolescents in aspiring
democracies and established democracies demonstrated differed significantly in: (a) civil
liberties values, (b) engagement, and (c) trust. Figure 6 presents the obtained results.
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Figure 6: Average Levels of Democratic Orientations among Adolescents in
Aspiring and Established Democracies
51
50.5

50.35
50.05

Means score

50
49.5
49

49.07
48.73
48.42

48.5

Aspiring Democracies
48.08

48

Esstablished Democracies

47.5
47
46.5
Civil
Liberties

Engagement

Trust

Note: Mean scores are shown for adolescents in aspiring democracies (Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and
Russia) and established democracies (Austria, Belgium Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy,
The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland).
Analysis showed a significant difference between the two groups with regard to
all three variables of interest: (a) t(21493) = 100.83, p < .001; (b) t(21465) = -21.70, p
< .001; and (c) t(21337) = 64.52, p < .001. Results also showed that adolescents in
aspiring democracies had lower endorsement of civil liberties values (M = 48.73, SD =
1.00) than adolescents in established democracies (M = 50.35, SD = 1.31). With regard to
trust, the direction of the relationship between the two groups was the same: adolescents
in aspiring democracies reported lower levels of trust (M = 48.08, SD = 2.36) than
adolescents in established democracies (M = 50.05, SD = 2.10). Surprisingly, in the area
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of democratic orientation dealing with social and political engagement, adolescents from
aspiring democracies showed higher levels of engagement (M = 49.07, SD = 2.06)
compared to adolescents from established democracies (M = 48.42, SD = 2.36). Mean
levels of endorsement of each of the three democratic orientation factors are presented in
Figure 6. Of note, because Levine’s test was significant (p < .001), indicating that the
assumption of equality of variances was violated, a t statistic not assuming homogeneity
of variance was considered. Thus the results should be interpreted with caution.
As can be seen from Figure 6, adolescents in established democracies have, on
average, higher levels of democratic orientation. In contrast, adolescents in aspiring
democracies tend to score lower on the identified aspects of democratic orientation, with
the exception of the engagement dimension. How does a history of a country’s past
regime relate to this variation in democratic orientation? How might a different, more
detailed, classification of countries affect the distribution of scores? The section that
follows addresses these questions.
Examining Variation in Democratic Orientations
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant positive relationship between a country’s history of
democratic tradition and adolescents’ democratic orientations.
To test the hypotheses about the direction of the relationship between adolescents’
democratic orientations and past regimes of their countries, bivariate correlational
analyses were conducted. Specifically, Pearson correlation coefficients were computed
for each dimension of democratic orientation and a past regime of the adolescents’
country of origin. At first glance, results seem to confirm the hypothesized relationships
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and are consistent with the findings established in the first part. However, a closer look at
the data revealed that the first hypothesis was supported only partially. There was a
significant positive relationship between adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties and a
history of democratic tradition in their countries , r(21762) = .57, p < .001. A significant
positive relationship was also established between adolescents’ trust and a history of
democratic tradition, r(21762) = .41, p < .001. Surprisingly, the relationship between the
engagement dimension of democratic orientation and a history of democratic tradition
was found to be negative, r(21762) = -.14, p < .001.
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant negative relationship between a country’s history of
communism and adolescents’ democratic orientation.
Correlations between dimensions of democratic orientation and a country’s
history of communism indicate that a significantly negative relationship exists between
two dimensions of democratic orientation, trust and civil liberties, and a history of
communism, r(21762) = -.57, p < .001 and r(21762) = -.41, p < .001, respectively.
Additionally, a significant positive correlation was established between a history of
communism and the engagement aspect of democratic orientation, r(21762) = .14, p
< .001.
The results presented so far indicate that history appears an important element in
examining cross-cultural variation in adolescents’ democratic orientations. To what
extent do different historical legacies influence this variation? This question was
addressed in the following section.
Hypothesis 3: Historical legacies impact adolescents’ democratic orientations differently.
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Hypothesis 3a: Adolescents in states with Patrimonial communist legacy will have lower
levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with Bureaucratic and
Accommodative communist legacies.
Hypothesis 3b: Adolescents in states with Bureaucratic communist legacy will have
lower levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with
Accommodative communist legacy.
Hypothesis 3c: Adolescents in states with Accommodative communist legacy will have
lower levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with a legacy of
democratic tradition.
A one-way ANOVA was used to test the impact of different types of historical
legacy on democratic orientations. Where the initial differences were established,
posteriori tests were conducted to elicit specific group differences. Results are
summarized below for each of three dimensions. Table 6 presents mean scores and
standard deviations for each dimension by legacy.
Table 6: Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation by Historical Legacy
Historical legacy

Civil liberties Engagement

Trust

Bureaucratic socialism
(Czech Republic, Slovak Republic)

48.33 (.58)

46.35 (.41)

47.05 (.99)

Accommodative socialism
(Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Estonia,
Poland)
Patrimonial socialism
(Bulgaria, Russia)

49.17 (.98)

49.42 (1.50)

47.22 (1.83)

48.26 (1.00)

51.10 (.83)

50.87 (2.10)

Democratic tradition
(Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium)

50.35 (1.31)

48.42 (2.36)

50.05 (2.10)
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Historical legacy and civil liberties. A significant difference was found between
different types of historical legacies regarding civil liberties, F(3, 21491) = 102.11, p
< .001. Posteriori tests were conducted to establish group differences, using the
Bonferroni post hoc criterion for significance. These tests produced mixed results.
Overall, it was found that adolescents from countries with a history of democracy had
significantly higher levels of endorsement of civil liberties values (M = 50.35, SD = 7.62)
than adolescents from countries with all three types of socialist legacies (combined M =
48.58, SD = 6.62). The comparison of civil liberties endorsement among adolescents
from states with Bureaucratic and Patrimonial socialist legacies was non-significant. All
other pairwise comparisons yielded significant results. In short, hypothesis 3a was
supported partially and hypotheses 3b and 3c were confirmed.
Historical legacy and engagement. A test of the effect of legacy types on
engagement produced significant results, suggesting that adolescents from states with
four different types of legacy had significantly different levels of engagement, F(3,
21463) = 201.36, p < .001. Posteriori tests further revealed that all four groups were
significantly different from each other. However, the direction of these relationships
differed from the hypothesized ones. For example, students in countries with the most
restrictive types of socialist legacy, Patrimonial legacy, reported higher levels of
engagement than students in states with less restrictive past socialist regimes. Moreover,
adolescents in states with Patrimonial legacy scored higher on the engagement measure
than adolescents in states with a history of democratic tradition. Overall, the results
indicated that students from countries with more restrictive communist legacies had
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significantly higher engagement scores than adolescents from countries with less
restrictive communist legacies. Thus, all hypotheses were rejected.
Historical legacy and trust. Analyses of the differences in adolescents’
democratic orientations on the basis of historical legacy further showed that the effect of
a specific type of the past regime had an impact on the extent to which adolescents
displayed trust attitudes, F(3, 21284) = 260.86, p < .001. According to posthoc results,
adolescents from countries with a history of democratic tradition scored, on average,
higher (M = 51.20, SD = 9.40) than adolescents from countries with Accommodative (M
= 46.86; SD = 8.92) and Bureaucratic (M = 48.36, SD = 9.41) communist legacies.
Surprisingly, adolescents from countries with Patrimonial legacy scored, on average,
higher than adolescents in countries with Accommodative and Bureaucratic previous
regimes. However, the results showed no significant difference in trust levels between
adolescents from countries with a history of democratic tradition and states with
Patrimonial socialist legacy. Similarly, no significant difference was established in trust
levels among adolescents in states with Bureaucratic and Accommodative legacies. In
sum, in regard to trust, hypothesis 3c was supported while hypotheses 3a and 3b were
rejected.
Distribution of Scores
To find out how democratic orientations were distributed among adolescents in
countries with different types of historical legacies, the sample was divided into two parts
for each of the factors. The first part consisted of students who reported high levels of
endorsement of civil liberties, engagement, and trust attitudes. Alternatively, the second
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part included students with lower levels of endorsement of each of the three factors. For
purposes of this analysis, the cutting point was the average of each scale, with lower
scores assigned to those adolescents who scored below the average and higher scores to
all students who scored above the average. Frequency statistics for both subgroups were
generated. Table 7 presents the distribution of democratic orientation by each dimension.
As is shown, countries with a history of democratic tradition have, on average, a higher
proportion of democratically-oriented adolescents than do countries with communist
legacies. However, this relationship is reversed when the engagement dimension of
democratic orientation is considered separately.
Table 7: Distribution of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientations across Historical
Legacies
Dimension
of
democratic
orientation

Level of

Type of historical legacy

endorsement Bureaucratic

Accommo-

Patrimonial

Established

Socialism

dative

Socialism

democracy

(%)

Socialism

(%)

(%)

(%)
Civil

Low

58.1

52.8

58.6

45.7

liberties

High

41.9

47.2

41.4

54.3

Engagement

Low

60.3

38.7

29.6

46.6

High

39.7

61.3

70.4

53.4

Low

59.3

66.4

48.6

42.1

High

40.7

33.6

51.4

57.9

Trust
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The Impact of Democratic Institutions
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between the quality of democratic
institutions and adolescents’ democratic orientation.
To test the hypotheses about the direction of the relationship between adolescents’
democratic orientation and the quality of democratic institutions in their countries,
correlational analyses were conducted. Specifically, Pearson correlation coefficients were
computed for each dimension of democratic orientation and the quality of democracy in
adolescents’ country of origin. Hypothesis 4 was supported only partially. There was a
significant positive relationship between adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties and
the quality of democratic institutions in their countries, r(21762) = .59, p < .001. A small
but significant positive relationship was also established between adolescents’ trust and
the quality of democracy, r(21762) = .12, p < .001. Conversely, the engagement
dimension of democratic orientation appeared to be negatively related to the quality of
democratic institutions, r(21762) = -.55, p < .001. The below figures 7, 8, and 9 illustrate
these results.

118

Figure 7: The Quality of Democracy and Civil Liberties
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Figure 8: The Quality of Democracy and Trust
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Figure 9: The Quality of Democracy and Engagement

Thus far, the results demonstrate that both historical legacy and the quality of
contemporary democratic institutions have an effect, to varying degrees, on adolescents’
democratic orientation. The question arises as to whether one of the two broad factors is
more influential in determining adolescents’ endorsement of each of the three democratic
dimensions. This question is addressed next.
Hypothesis 5: Historical legacy is more important in determining adolescents’ democratic
orientation than the current quality of democratic institutions.
To determine whether historical legacy or the quality of current democratic
institutions is more important in determining adolescents’ democratic orientation,
121

multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted. MANOVA is often
considered an extension of simple ANOVA techniques and is used to determine group
differences in models with more than one dependent variable (Field, 2005). Among
advantages of this technique is that it allows to take into account several dependent
variables simultaneously as well as interaction between these variables.
General linear modeling (GLM) procedure was utilized to test the effects of
historical legacies and the quality of democratic institutions on each of the three
dimensions of adolescents’ democratic orientation. In addition, a third variable denoting
the gender of adolescents was added to the model. Because of the continuous nature of
the variable, the Quality of Democracy Index was entered as a covariate. Altogether, two
different models were run to test the hypothesis. First, individual sores were used in each
predictor variable. The model was then ran again, using aggregate country scores for the
dependent variables. Table 8 contains the results of both tests. The F value statistics
indicate the relative contribution of each predictor variable to value of the outcome
variable. Higher values indicate better explanatory power.
The hypothesis was only partially supported. With the exception of trust, the
results revealed that the quality of democratic institutions has a greater effect on
adolescents’ democratic orientation than historical legacy (coefficients presented in bold
in Table 8). Conversely, historical legacy appeared a better contributor to the trust
dimension of adolescents’ democratic orientation. Overall, the results were consistent for
both individual scores and aggregate measures.
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Additionally, the results revealed some differences in regard to explanatory power
of the determinant variables. Gender was found to be an important determinant of
adolescents’ democratic orientation. Despite the fact that the effect of gender was not
specified in the hypothesis, it was found to outweigh both historical legacy and the
quality of democratic institutions in its influence on civil liberties. Interestingly, the
gender effect disappeared when aggregate scores were entered in the model. Table 8
summarizes these results.
Table 8: The Impact of Historical Legacies and the Quality of Democratic
Institutions on Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation
Determinant
Variable

Dependent Variable

Intercept

Civil liberties
Engagement
Trust
Civil liberties
Engagement
Trust
Civil liberties
Engagement
Trust
Civil liberties
Engagement
Trust

Historical Legacy
Quality of
Democracy
Gender

F Value
(individual scores)
6717.62**
13005.17**
5139.25**
21.97**
203.04**
251.45**
59.46**
644.81**
49.13**
479.36**
.001
5.56*

F Value
(aggregate
scores)
291999.13**
313161.78**
91480.78**
1030.47**
4379.56**
4914.01**
2588.26**
15530.90**
860.97**
.46
.37
.55

Note: * p < .01, ** p < .001.
Exploring Implications of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation
Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of democratic orientation among adolescents, the
higher their intentions with regard to participation in future social and political activities.
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Hierarchical Regressions
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to find out whether
students’ democratic orientation influences their intentions in regard to participation in
future social and political activities. Specifically, the regression analyses tested to what
extent each dimension of democratic orientation predicts students’ involvement in
different political and social activities. Altogether, five different regressions were run for
each form of expected participation: involvement in legal protest, involvement in illegal
protest, electoral participation, formal political participation, and informal political
participation. Of note, the primary goal of these analyses was to investigate the
relationship between different aspects of adolescents’ democratic orientation and their
expected involvement in social and political activities, rather than create a model that
predicts factors that best explain such future involvement. That is why a limited number
of independent variables were used.
Based on theoretic considerations and previous research, two indicators of
students’ background, gender and home literacy resources, were entered into the model
first. To find out how much each of the dimensions of democratic orientation would
contribute to each form of participation, “civil liberties,” “engagement,” and “trust”
variables were entered as a second, third, and fourth and steps, respectively. Regression
analyses were repeated for each of the five available types of participation. R2 statistic
indicates the significance and amount of variance explained by each predictor. R2 change
statistic represents the unique amount of variance that is explained solely by the predictor
entered in a specific step. Unstandardized coefficients (reported in Table 9 along with
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standard errors) denote the extent to which each predictor explains variation in
participatory expectations. The results are presented below for each dimension of
democratic orientation. Table 9 summarizes the results and presents them in five groups,
one for each type of expected participation. Unstandardized regression coefficients are
reported with standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 9: Regression of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation on their Expected Participation in Future Political and
Social Activities
Variables
Steps
Step 1:
Home
literacy
resources

Involvement in Legal Protest
Step 1 Step 2 Step
Step 4
3

Involvement in Illegal Protest
Step 1
Step 2 Step 3
Step 4

Electoral Participation
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3

Step 4

.91**
(.05)

1.18**
Gender
(.13)
(1=girl)
Step 2:
Civil liberties

.67**
(.05)

.42**
(.05)

.43**
(.5)

-.27**
(.05)

-.15*
(.05)

-.18*
(.05)

-.24**
(.05)

1.37**
(.05)

1.04**
(.05)

.76**
(.05)

.84**
(.05)

.35*
(.13)

.80**
(.12)

.82**
(.12)

-3.23**
(.14)

-2.8**
(.14)

-2.8**
(.14)

-2.9**
(.14)

.80**
(.14)

-.31*
(.13)

.22
(.12)

.35*
(.12)

.29**
(.01)

.16**
(.01)

.16**
(.01)

-.15**
(.01)

-.16**
(.01)

-.15**
(.01)

.40**
(.01)

.24**
(.01)

.22**
(.01)

.48**
(.01)

.47**
(.01)

.05**
(.01)

.11**
(.010)

.560**
(.01)

.49**
(.01)

.18**
.12**

.02**
(.11)
.18**
.001*

.04**
.001**

-.18**
(.01)
.06**
.02**

.26**
.15**

.22
(.01)
.28**
.03**

Step 3:
Engagement
Step 4:
Trust
R2
R2 change

.020**

.07**
.05**

.028**

.04**
.01**
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.03**

.11**
.07**

Table 9 (Continued)
Variables
Steps
Step 1:
Home literacy
resources

Formal Political Participation
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4

Informal Political Participation
Step 1
Step 2 Step 3 Step 4

.32**
(.05)

.30**
(.05)

.01
(.05)

.08
(.05)

.74**
(.05)

.60**
(.05)

.30**
(.04)

.27**
(.04)

Gender (1=girl)

-1.01**
(.13)

-1.08**
(.13)

-.54**
(.12)

-.43**
(.12)

.29*
(.13)

-.17
(.13)

.46**
(.17)

.47**
(.116)

.03*
(.01)

.13**
(.01)

.14**
(.01)

.162**
(.01)

.03*
(.01)

.03*
(.01)

.57**
(.01)

.50**
(.01)

.68**
(.01)

.68**
(.01)

Step 2:
Civil liberties
Step 3:
Engagement
Step 4:
Trust
R2
R2 change

.20**
(.01)
.01**

.01**
.001**

.18**
.17**

.20**
.02**

.02**
(.01)
.01**

Note: * p < .01, ** p < .001
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.03**
.02**

.27**
.25**

.27**
.001**

The Effect of Civil Liberties on Prospective Citizen Participation
A series of hierarchical regressions examined whether adolescents’ endorsement
of civil liberties predicts their intentions to participate in political life upon reaching
adulthood. Because the civil liberties variable was entered as the second step in all
models, the results for all types of participation can be obtained from the row Step 2 in
Table 9 below.
In general, adding the civil liberties variable resulted in modest but significant
improvements to the models by increasing the proportion of total explained variance of
various kinds of anticipated participation. Specifically, in the models of anticipated
involvement in legal and illegal protest, civil liberties variable produced a significant
change in the total explained variance, F (3, 20892) = 489.91, p < .001 and F (3, 20836)
= 281.40, p < .001, respectively. In the model of prospective electoral participation, the
addition of civil liberties was also significant, F (3, 20814) = 84271, p < .001. Finally,
civil liberties was as significant contributor to in the models projecting future
participation in formal and informal political activities, F (3, 20796) = 34.17, p < .001
and F (3, 20759) = 177.35, respectively.
The percentage of the unique portion of the variance explained by civil liberties
ranged from 1% in formal and informal forms of participation to 7% in the involvement
in legal protest. Out of five types of participation examined, civil liberties appeared to
have the most influence on expected electoral participation than on other type of future
participation, with R2 = .11, p > .001.
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Interestingly, civil liberties entered one model negatively, suggesting that the
higher adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties, the lower their intentions with regard
to participation in illegal protest in the future. These results provide initial evidence about
the significance of this particular aspect of adolescents’ democratic orientation for their
future involvement.
The Effect of Engagement on Prospective Citizen Participation
Adding the engagement variable to the models of expected citizen participation
resulted in significant change in the amount of variance associated with the models,
suggesting that adolescents’ engagement appears a significant predictor of their intentions
to participate in all five types of future citizen activities. The biggest contribution was
observed in regard to the following two activities: (a) prospected participation in
elections and (b) prospected participation in informal political activities. The unique
portion of variance attributed to these models was 26% and 27%, respectively. Next,
engagement appeared to increase the likelihood of holding positive views about future
participation in future formal activities and legal protest, with 18% of variation explained
for both models. The smallest contribution of this variable was observed in the model of
expected involvement in illegal protest, where engagement accounted for 4% of total
variance. In contrast to the previously analyzed aspect of civil liberties, the engagement
variable did not enter any of the models negatively, suggesting that, all other variables
being the same, the higher adolescents’ engagement, the higher they rate their likelihood
of getting involved in political and social activities upon reaching adulthood.
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The Effect of Trust on Prospective Citizen Participation
A unique contribution of the trust aspect of adolescents’ democratic orientation
was assessed in the 4th step of each of the five regressions models. Similar to the other
two aspects, civil liberties and engagement, trust appeared a significant predictor of all
forms of future participatory activities. Also, similar to the civil liberties dimension,
adding trust to the model of expected involvement in illegal protest produced a negative
coefficient, suggesting that higher levels of trust among adolescents diminish their
intentions to get involved in illegal protest as adults. Of note, trust was found to be the
smallest contributor to all models of prospective participation in comparison with the
other two dimensions. Thus, the percentage of unique variance explained by trust ranged
from less than 1% to 3%, for models predicting involvement in legal protest and electoral
participation, respectively.
Summary for Regressions
Overall, the regression analyses showed that adolescents’ democratic orientation
significantly influences their expectations with regard to future participation in various
political and social activities. These influences appeared significant, regardless of
adolescents’ gender or home literacy resources. In more detail, it was established that the
likelihood of adolescents’ future participation in social and political activities is better
explained by their current levels of engagement than by their endorsement of civil
liberties values or trust attitudes.
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Bonus Research
Bonus Research Hypothesis: Adolescents can be classified into distinct groups based on
their democratic orientation.
Why do cross-cultural differences in adolescents’ democratic orientation matter?
Before addressing this question, it is first necessary to establish whether it is, indeed,
possible to discriminate adolescents of one country, or group of countries, from
adolescents in another state based on their responses to a series of questions relevant to
democracy. To test this claim, a discriminant function analysis was carried out. In more
detail, two discriminant function analyses utilizing both sources of democratic orientation
– (a) the scores from the three dimensions of democratic orientation and (b) scores from
the original ICCS scales of democratic attitudes - were run. This was done in order to
compare the predictive power of each measure. Of note, only seven original scales were
used because discriminant analysis allows a limited number of predictor variables (for
details, see Fields, 2005, or Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996 ). Kitschelt’s historical legacies
classification modified by Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon (2010) was used as a dependent
variable for classifying adolescents into groups.
Overall, results revealed three significant variates that differentiate between
different groups that represent historical legacies of adolescents’ countries of origin. In
other words, differences between adolescents’ democratic orientations can be explained
with the help of three underlying dimensions. Thus, the results established that
adolescents’ attitudes toward gender equality, trust attitudes, and feelings of internal
political efficacy make the largest contribution to each of the three identified variates. Of
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note, the variable measuring support for gender equality makes the largest contribution in
comparison with other variables in the model. Appendix C presents details on each of the
variates. The distinction between different groups is seen in Figure 10 that presents a
combined plot of group scores for each country. The variate scores are presented for
adolescents, grouped according to the historical legacy of their country. Group centroids
(shown in red in Figure 10) indicate average variate scores for each country grouping.
Additionally, the results revealed that original scales of democratic beliefs and
attitudes were better at categorizing adolescents into groups with corresponding historical
legacies than the three dimensions of democratic orientation. Thus, the discriminant
analysis conducted with the original variables related to the endorsement of democratic
principles correctly classified 95.5% of the original grouped cases. In turn, the three
dimensions of democratic orientation were able to classify 73.1% of adolescents as
belonging to a group with a specific historical legacy. The results presented above and
shown in Figure 10 relate to the analysis that utilized scores from the original ICCS
scales of democratic attitudes.
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Figure 10: Country Groupings based on Adolescents’ Democratic Orientations

Note: Types of Historical Legacy:
Accommodative socialism;

Bureaucratic socialism;

Patrimonial socialism;

Established democracy.
Bonus Finding

Throughout this research, support for gender equality has consistently appeared
among the most powerful variables responsible for cross-cultural variation in
adolescents’ democratic orientations. In investigating the relationship between
institutional characteristic and adolescents’ democratic orientation, a surprisingly strong
relationship was established (R2 linear = .77). The relevant scores were plotted in order to
show the degree of interrelationship between the two variables. Figure 11 illustrates the
results.
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Support for Gender Equality

Figure 11: Adolescents’ Gender Equality Attitudes and the Quality of Democracy

Quality of Democracy Index
Note: Types of Historical Legacy:
Accommodative socialism;

Bureaucratic socialism;
Established democracy.
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Patrimonial socialism;

CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION
Summary and Analysis of Findings
Data analyses addressed the three main objectives of this research. First, an
exploratory factor analysis identified the underlying dimensions of adolescents’
democratic orientation, followed by confirmatory and reliability analyses that verified a
latent structure of democratic orientation and established construct validity of scales that
measure the identified dimensions. Second, the results revealed important cross-cultural
variations in the degree to which adolescents display each of the dimensions of
democratic orientation. Specifically, the levels of endorsement of civil liberties values,
engagement, and trust attitudes varied among adolescents’ in established and aspiring
democracies. Additionally, correlational analyses established important relationships
between country-level variations in adolescents’ democratic orientations and historical
legacies of their countries on the one hand and the quality of contemporary democratic
institutions on the other hand. Third, this study established that adolescents’ democratic
orientation matters for a long-term democratic outlook of their countries. Controlling for
some factors, adolescents’ democratic orientation appeared significant predictors of their
intentions to participate in political and social matters upon reaching adulthood.
These results are important for several reasons. First, this study sheds light on the
nature of democratic attitudes and values displayed by adolescents in countries with
varying social, economic, and political situations. In doing so, the study confirms the
validity of cultural theories in explaining variation in democratic attitudes among
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younger generations. Additionally, the results indicate that institutional approaches to
studying democratic preferences provide important insights for analyzing these attitudes
among 14-15 year olds. Finally, with respect to potential consequences of adolescents’
democratic attitudes, this research contributes to the literature on democratization by
projecting the extent to which the analyzed societies might have politically and socially
active citizens in years to come. The sections below analyze these results in more detail
and consider implications from the study for research and policy making.
Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation: One Concept, Three Dimensions
Similar to other concepts commonly used in social science research, the concept
of a democratic citizen orientation is latent in nature and cannot be measured directly.
This is reflected in a lack of consensus on the part of researchers and policymakers on
how to best describe and analyze individuals’ values and attitudes associated with a
democratic way of life. As a result, no single measure has been created to capture public
endorsement of democratic values. Instead, researchers have employed various
instruments and analytic techniques in attempts to assess different aspects of individuals’
democratic mindset. One such technique, factor analysis, was utilized in this study. By
employing factor analysis techniques, one can identify underlying dimensions, or latent
components, that reflect the multi-faceted concept of a democratic orientation.
Considering findings from classical and modern studies of democracy, a number
of elements within democratic orientation were identified as necessary features of a
democratically-oriented citizen: tolerance and respect for diversity, gender equality,
interest in social and political affairs of the country and willingness to participate in them,
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and trust. Variables reflecting adolescents’ democratic orientation were entered into a
model and subjected to an exploratory factor analysis. The factors that emerged from this
analysis could be meaningfully interpreted as supporting the initial proposition about the
multidimensional character of a democratic citizen orientation. Specifically, adolescents’
democratic orientation was found to revolve around three broad themes: (1) equity,
tolerance, and respect for diversity; (2) active role of citizens in a society, and (3)
perceived legitimacy of democratic institutions and state authorities. Of note, the analyses
conducted with individual countries versus the pooled sample produced the same results,
suggesting that adolescents across countries do not possess a homogenous democratic
mindset, but rather that their democratic orientation presents a multidimensional pattern
of three distinct but interrelated dimensions consistently present across countries. Results
from confirmatory factor analyses further supported this initial finding by indicating that
the models were a good fit for the data utilized in this study.
The results of exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses are representative of
two major theoretical perspectives on democratic society. Specifically, the identified
dimensions reflect the participatory, or communitarian, view of democracy as well as the
perspective of liberal democratic theorists. The first perspective is evident in the
engagement disposition domain, while the second is reflected in the civil liberties
dimension of adolescents’ democratic worldview. Trust appears to be an important
component in democratic societies from the point of view of theorists of both liberal and
participatory democracy. More generally, this conceptualization of democratic orientation
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is consistent with previous theoretic inquiries that established multidimensional nature of
democracy (for example, Dahl, 1971).
In sum, defining a democratically-oriented citizen has been a subject of ongoing
debates in academic, policy, and government circles. Despite differences in the way
researchers, scholars, and even ordinary individuals perceive democratic citizenry, there
is a general agreement that this notion is highly complex. This research adds to the
literature by suggesting a three-dimensional way of examining attitudes, values, and
behaviors of one of the younger cohorts of democratically-oriented citizens, 14-15 yearolds. Thus based on the findings, adolescents’ democratic orientation can be
characterized as a complex concept that integrates three separate but interrelated
components: (a) civil liberties, (b) engagement, and (c) trust attitudes.
Variation in Democratic Orientations among Adolescents in Aspiring and
Established Democracies
Well-established differences in democratic functioning between countries of
Western Europe and North America on the one hand and post-communist societies of
Eastern and Central Europe on the other raise the question whether these differences find
reflection at the level of individuals’ adherence to democratic values and beliefs.
Comparisons of democratic orientations between adolescents in aspiring and established
democracies produced mixed answers to this question.
Overall, important cross-country variations were established in democratic
orientations among adolescents from different states. Generally, levels of democratic
orientation were higher among adolescents from established democracies than among
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adolescents from aspiring democracies. However, a closer look at the data revealed that
the results were not uniform across the three dimensions of democratic orientation. Thus,
on measures of civil liberties and trust, students from more established democracies,
indeed, scored higher than students from states with a less stable or consistent democratic
record. Conversely, in the area dealing with political and social engagement, adolescents
in aspiring democracies were found to have higher scores than adolescents in most
mature democracies. Additional analyses revealed that countries with a history of
democratic tradition have, on average, a higher proportion of students who score higher
than average on the measures of democratic orientation than do adolescents in countries
with a history of communist regime. Interestingly, the direction of this relationship was
reversed if the engagement dimension of democratic orientation was considered
separately.
These findings suggest that adolescents in countries that are moving toward
democratic consolidation are less trusting and less likely to endorse civil liberties and
values than their peers in established democracies. This is consistent with research on
democratization that posits that younger democracies have a long way to go with regard
to their citizens developing true democratic norms and behaviors (Dimitrova-Grajzl &
Simon, 2010; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Nikolayenko, 2011b; Rose, 2009).
Another possible explanation of lower levels of democratic orientation among
adolescents in aspiring democracies might be reflective of a relatively recent history of
democratic tradition in these societies. Generally, in consolidated democracies, the adult
population undertakes the function of passing basic democratic values and behavioral
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patterns to younger generations. In contrast, adult populations in post-communist
societies were themselves faced with the need to learn democratic values and to be
educated about basic principles of a democratic culture (Nikolayenko, 2011). Thus, this
might be among the reasons why adolescents in aspiring democracies might display
lower levels of certain aspects of democratic orientation than their peers in established
democracies. This in turn, points to the need to investigate the processes through which
adolescent’s acquire democratic values and endorse democratic principles.
However, the fact that adolescents in post-communist countries are more likely to
report greater involvement and interest in political and social matters of their countries
than adolescents in societies with established democratic infrastructure challenges
conventional wisdom about the weakness of civil society in most post-communist states
(Howard, 2003). Additionally, these relatively high levels of engagement may be
considered a positive indicator of prospective democratic developments in aspiring
democracies (e.g., see Dalton, 2000.
At the same time, the results indicating low levels of self-reported engagement
among adolescents in established democracies supports numerous clams in the literature
of low civic engagement among adolescents and young adults (for example, Flanagan,
Levine, & Settersten, 2009; Kirby & Kawashima-Ginsburg, 2009; McDonald, 2008;
Smith et al., 2011; Twenge, Campbell, & Freeman, 2012). In contrast, the observed
picture of low participation and interest in political and social issues among younger
generations might be indicative of the changing political culture in established
democracies, a trend that has occupied political and social science scholars over the last
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several decades (for a summary see Dalton, 2000). In more detail, proponents of the
changing democratic landscape, especially with regard to established democracies, argue
that the general public may no longer endorse some traditional elements of a democratic
political culture, but rather choose to support new structures and elements within
democratic society. If this is the case, then it is possible to suggest that a relatively low
level of adolescents’ engagement is, indeed, indication that they reject this aspect of
democratic citizen orientation. This, in turn, calls for an expansion of the concept of
political citizen engagement and, subsequently, for a more thorough investigation of
alternative ways of measuring citizen engagement.
Overall, these preliminary differences call for a more thorough investigation of
factors associated with variation in levels of adolescents’ democratic orientations across
countries. Potential influences of historical and institutional factors on adolescents’
democratic attitudes are discussed next.
Historical and Institutional Factors in Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation
Democratization studies reviewed earlier suggest that at least two broad
theoretical approaches are utilized in research on values, beliefs, and behavioral
orientations that are relevant for the development of democracy. On the one hand,
cultural theories emphasize the importance of historical legacies in analyzing and even
predicting a number of democratic phenomena. On the other hand, institutional
approaches point to the defining role of contemporary democratic institutions and their
perceived performance in shaping attitudes and beliefs of democratically oriented
citizens. This study utilized both approaches by analyzing how each of the two groups of
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factors associated with variation in democratic attitudes – (1) historical legacy and (2) the
quality of contemporary democratic institutions – relate to variation in democratic
orientation among adolescents.
The Influence of Historical Legacies
To test whether historic legacies matter for adolescents’ democratic orientatios,
all cases were divided into four groups according to Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon’s
(2010) classification of communist legacies. More specifically, this part of research
examined the extent to which adolescents’ attitudes and behaviors relevant to democracy
are associated with a specific type of a previous communist regime. The main hypothesis
was that the degree to which younger generations in each society endorse democratic
values would be related to the degree of overall restrictiveness of a specific type of
historical legacy.
Overall, it was found that different types of historical legacies were associated
with the degree to which adolescents (a) endorsed civil liberties values, (b) reported
interest and involvement in socio-political issues, and (c) placed trust in state institutions
and authorities. For the most part, the direction of this relationship supported a general
hypothesis about the persisting influence of historical legacies, indicating that democratic
orientation among citizens in post-communist societies, including younger generations
without a direct experience of a communist regime, is still largely influenced by previous
regimes of their societies. Of note, despite the fact that the hypotheses about the
restrictiveness of different kinds of post-communist regimes were supported only
partially, the results merit some attention. Thus, the fact that no negative relationship was
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documented between adolescents’ engagement and different types of ex-communist
regimes might indicate that the legacy of communism has more positive implications for
democracy than what had been accepted before (Dalton, 2000). To some extent, this is
consistent with earlier claims in the literature about influences of former communist
regimes on contemporary democratic functioning. As Dalton observed, “The patterns of
civil society and volunteerism that reinforce citizen action movements in the West are
seen as reflections of the mobilized society of the Communist era” (p. 934).
In summary, the answer to the question of how adolescents in states with more
restrictive former communist regimes compare to adolescents in states with less
restrictive communist legacies remains unanswered, given mixed results for all three
dimensions of their democratic orientation.
The Impact of Democratic Functioning
An alternative explanation to the question of cross-cultural variation in
adolescents’ democratic attitudes considers the extent to which societies have developed
an effective democratic infrastructure (Schimmelfennig, 2000). In considering
institutional factors associated with adolescents’ democratic orientation, it was
established that the quality of current democratic institutions was positively related to
adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties and levels of trust. At the same time, a
negative relationship was observed between the state of democratic institutions and
engagement potential of adolescents, supporting numerous claims in the literature about
disengaged younger generations in developed democracies.
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Another possible explanation might be that adolescents living in transitioning
democracies are witnessing many rapid transformations that are still occurring in their
societies and might be directly affected by them. It is possible to suggest that adolescents
might experience these influences in their day-to-day activities and thus show a genuine
interest and desire to take a part in these processes. In addition, given the lasting effect
that historical legacy has on various public attitudes, it is possible to speculate that an
adolescent might view their society’s past in a positive light by believing that a change is
possible. That is, in comparison with undemocratic practices of the communist regime,
adolescents might perceive the current functioning of democratic institutions as a
successful outcome of citizens’ efforts to change the previous regime. At the same time,
considering the relative stability of democratic regimes in most Western European and
Scandinavian states analyzed in this research, adolescents might take certain participatory
infrastructure for granted and consider participation in conventional political and social
matters, at least in their conventional forms, less engaging.
Historical Legacies or Democratic Functioning: What Matters More?
When a multivariate model of democratic orientation was considered, some
mixed results were produced with regard to relative contribution of institutional and
historical factors to adolescents’ democratic orientation. On the one hand, historical
legacy appeared more important in determining adolescents’ trust attitudes than was the
quality of current democratic institutions. On the other hand, the contribution of the
quality of democratic institutions to adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties and
engagement potential was significantly higher than that of historical legacies. In other
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words, an adolescents’ being from a state with a fully developed democratic
infrastructure is a more powerful indicator of their civil liberties and engagement
potential than is the legacy of their country of origin.
In sum, the multivariate model highlighted the influence of historical legacies and
institutional performance on shaping adolescents’ democratic orientation. The results of
the multivariate analysis of variance suggest that adolescents display varying levels of
engagement and civil liberties depending on institutional design and functioning of
democratic institutions, whereas variation in trust levels is mainly accounted for by
historical-political context of the countries in which they live. A general conclusion is
that neither institutional nor cultural theories can provide uniform explanations of
democratic orientation, at least as displayed by adolescents. That is, one theoretical
approach might be better at explaining a specific aspect of democratic citizen orientation
while an alternative theory might be better suited to explain another aspect. This, in turn,
highlights the need for theoretically innovative ways of analyzing and explaining
democratic attitudes. That a new explanation is needed is consistent with the current state
of democratization research in a broad sense, including studies of popular support for
democracy. As Diamond (2001) noted, “We are still a very long ways from being able to
determine very clearly and satisfactorily what generates sustainable support for
democracy” (p. 23).
Implications of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation
The third stage of this research explored implications of adolescents’ democratic
orientation for their potential involvement in future social and political activities. In more
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detail, the three dimensions of adolescents’ democratic orientation, civil liberties,
engagement, and trust, were regressed on five different forms of participation, including
formal and informal political participation, participation in legal and illegal protests, and
electoral participation. The results showed that the most important factor explaining
variation in adolescents’ intentions to participate in future activities was related to their
current levels of engagement. Thus, adolescents’ scores on the engagement scale
explained over a quarter of their variation in their intent to vote in future elections or
participate in informal social and political activities. Civil liberties endorsement appeared
a modest but significant predictor of students’ intentions to take part in social and
political life of their societies, accounting for about 7% of variation in one such intention.
Interestingly, the civil liberties variable entered one regression model negatively,
suggesting that the higher students’ score on this dimension the less likely they will be to
participate in illegal activities in the future. Similar effect was observed in terms of trust,
which produced negative coefficients, suggesting that the more trust adolescents place in
their state institutions and authorities, the smaller their intentions with regard to
participation in illegal protest are. However, the results from regressions should be
interpreted with caution because, as stated earlier, the models were developed primarily
to test the influence of democratic orientation on students’ predicted participation rather
than explain factors that account for such intentions.
Overall, these results confirm one of the main hypotheses of this research about
the importance of adolescents’ democratic orientation for their future roles as citizens and
for the future of their countries in general. This has important implications for studies
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focusing on democratic attitudes among younger generations. As noted in Chapter 2,
underage populations, including adolescents, are relatively understudied in
democratization research. In part, a smaller body of research on democratic attitudes
among younger populations can be explained by a lack of consensus about the validity of
studying this population group. Specifically, a number of authors have questioned the
utility of studying political attitudes among younger generations (Newton, 2001). Some
frequently brought up arguments in this regard include claims that young people’s
experiences with political institutions are often limited and thus youths cannot form
objective opinions with regard to certain social or political phenomena. Moreover, it is
generally accepted that adolescence is a period of intense development during which a
variety of attitudes, including a pro-democratic orientation, are formed and transformed
(Denver & Hands, 1990; Sapiro, 2004). Therefore, it is often assumed that attitudes that
characterize the period of adolescence are rarely stable and have little predictive value for
future attitudes that adolescents might develop in their adult life.
With regard to the importance of young people’s attitudes for shaping their future
values and behaviors, Sears, Hensler, and Speer (1979) noted:
People acquire in early life standing predispositions which influence their adult
perceptions and attitudes. In adulthood, then, they respond in a highly affective
way to symbols which resemble the attitude objects to which similar emotional
responses were conditioned or associated in earlier life. Whether or not the issue
has some tangible consequence for the adult voter’s personal life is irrelevant.
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One’s relevant personal ‘stake’ in the issue is an emotional, symbolic one; it
triggers long-held, habitual responses (pp. 370-371).
At the same time, as emphasized earlier, the value of young people’s perspectives
on democratic issues stems not only from potential contributions to the future of
democracy, but also, and even to a greater extent, because forming such a perspective is a
value in itself.
Bonus Research
The bonus part of this research addressed the question of predictive validity of
measures of democratic orientation for classifying adolescents into distinct groups based
on their scores on these measures. Historical legacy was used as a grouping variable to
help establish predictive validity of the measures at focus. In other words, the main goal
of this analysis was to find out whether democratic orientation could be used to
distinguish adolescents in countries with a history of communism from adolescents in
countries with a history of democratic tradition.
Overall, it could be concluded that adolescents can, in fact, be discriminated by
different aspects of democratic orientation. Specifically, the discriminant function results
indicate that among major variables that discriminate between adolescents’ countries of
origin in terms of their democratic orientation are the following: (a) attitudes toward
gender equality, (b) trust in institutions, and (c) internal political efficacy. Interestingly,
each of these three contributors are consistent with the three dimensions of adolescents’
democratic orientation identified earlier in this research – civil liberties, trust, and
engagement.
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Additionally, it can be suggested that adolescents from states with similar
historical legacies would display similar democratic orientations. Thus, looking at the
plot of group scores (see Figure 10 above), it can be that adolescents in Russia and
Bulgaria, the two states that share the same historical legacy (according to Kitschelt
(1995, 1997), have more in common with each other in terms of their democratic
orientations than with adolescents in states with a different communist legacy or with
history of democratic tradition.
The results of the discriminant function analysis are important because no
research has tested the predictive validity of democratic attitudes for classifying
individuals into different groups. Furthermore, the results have important implications for
comparative research and policy. Specifically, the results might be used to support
numerous claims about similarities of post-communist countries on a number of
important social, economic, and political indicators. Despite obvious differences in
historical and present conditions across countries in Eastern and Central Europe,
adolescents in these societies display similar democratic orientations
Implications for Research and Policy
Implications of this study are two-fold. First, the results of this dissertation are
likely to contribute to future research on democratic attitudes and democratization.
Second, this study has important implications for policies and programs aimed at
fostering democratic culture.
The primary goal of this dissertation was to improve the current understanding of
adolescents’ democratic orientation, which adds to theoretical accounts of democracy. A

149

theoretical contribution of this dissertation is that it expands the conceptualization of a
pro-democratic citizen orientation to include youths from societies with varying degrees
of democratic advancement. Through quantitative analyses of the ICCS and the Quality
of Democracy data, this dissertation fills a gap in the literature on attitudes toward
democratic values among younger generations by suggesting a three-dimensional model
to explain adolescents’ democratic mindset. Additionally, the research extends
democratization theory to account for historical legacies and the quality of contemporary
democratic institutions as forces that influence adolescents’ democratic orientation. In
doing so, the research confirmed the lasting effects of historical legacies by showing that
democratic orientation among adolescents with no direct experience of communist
regime appears constrained by their societies’ past. These findings point to the need for
more a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the communist past, particularly in
relation to individuals’ beliefs and values that continue to shape their attitudes towards
each other and towards the state in general. Another theoretical contribution of this study
is that it analyzes the potential of emerging democracies to develop successfully based on
the degree to which youths internalize democratic values and adhere to democratic
principles.
In sum, this study extends the previous research on democratic orientation among
the general public by focusing solely on democratic attitudes among adolescents, a group
that is relatively understudied in democratization research. Specifically, the dissertation
adds to the literature through (a) comparing of pro-democratic attitudes and behavioral
intentions among adolescents from emerging and established democracies, (b)
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investigating the extent to which historical legacies affect adolescents’ democratic
orientation, (c) examining links between the quality of democratic institutions and
adolescents’ democratic orientation, and (d) exploring the relationship between
adolescents’ democratic orientation and their expectations with regard to future political
and social participation.
Consequently, a better understanding of adolescents’ democratic orientation
should help inform policies designed to promote a culture of democracy and respect for
democratic values, particularly in transitioning countries. Generally, a policy is most
effective when it relies on valid and reliable data that provide accurate estimates with
regard to the population of interest. However, in order to develop and implement
effective policies that aim to foster a pro-democratic orientation among youths, it is
necessary first to identify attitudes that can be targeted.
In light of the above, established cross-cultural variation in democratic attitudes
elicits several policy implications. As was shown, adolescents in different countries
display varying levels of trust, endorsement of civil values, and engagement potential.
That historical legacy is a major force in determining adolescents’ trust levels is
particularly interesting. Improving adolescents’ perceptions of legitimacy of state
institutions and authorities have important consequences not only for the current state of
democracy, but also for prospective societal order. As was demonstrated, adolescents
who express higher levels of trust are less likely to believe that they will be engaged in
illegal protest when they reach adulthood. These implications seem particularly relevant
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for aspiring democracies, where (with an exception of Russia and Bulgaria) there are
more distrusting adolescents than those who trust.
At the same time, relatively high levels of engagement among adolescents in most
aspiring democracies point to a potential for favorable democratic prospects in these
societies. As Dalton (2000) pointed out the importance of engaged citizens, “Democracy
expects an active citizenry because it is through discussion, popular interest, and
involvement in politics that societal goals should be defined and carried out in a
democracy” (p. 927). High levels of citizen involvement, an important attribute of
effective democracies, might be considered an indicator of long-awaited democratic
consolidation in states that are at various stages of democratic transformation. Such
prognoses, however, are beyond the scope of this study and are only suggested as an
avenue for future research.
Furthermore, high levels of involvement in social and political matters among
adolescents in aspiring democracies offer some additional implications for policymaking.
First of all, what many feared as obstacles in engaging post-communist citizens given
decades of “ritualized engagement or actual prohibitions on participation” (Dalton, 2002,
p. 930) appear to have little effect on modern populations, at least among younger
cohorts. However, the challenge that remains is to channel this high level of engagement
into meaningful participation. In this regard, more attention needs to be dedicated to
identify factors that might be responsible for adolescents’ favorable opinions with regard
to participation and interest in political and social issues. In additon, policies that build on
and stimulate young people’s engagement should be given priority. Importantly, such
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policies need to be reflected in concrete programs and initiatives that enable young
people to develop their participatory skills and exercise their right to have a say in
matters relevant to their everyday activities. Failure to do so might reverse these positive
trends in democratic development. As Bandura (1982) observed, “Should change be
difficult to achieve, given suitable alternatives people will desert environments that are
unresponsive to their efforts and pursue their activities elsewhere” (p. 141). To some
extent, increasing number of young people in many post-communist societies who choose
to live permanently in other, often more developed, states further illustrate the necessity
to adequately respond to young people’s needs to take part in processes affecting their
lives.
In addition, knowledge of democratic orientation among younger populations
might help formulate tools for a more comprehensive analysis of current and future
democratic developments. In this regard, this study suggests that the position of youth,
especially their values and behavioral intentions, needs explicit consideration in measures
of democratic functioning. Young people’s attitudes and beliefs condition their behavior
and could determine the course of democratic developments in the near future, as
demonstrated by findings from regression analyses.
Finally, the results from this research might inform some policy debates that focus
on democracy promotion and consolidation. Mainly because the results are not uniform
but rather mixed, they can be used to support numerous claims that democracy has a long
way to go in most aspiring democracies. At the same time, those who believe in a more
promising course of democratic development in transitioning states might find interesting
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the results suggesting high levels of engagement among adolescents in those states,
which might indicate that at the level of public beliefs and expectations, democracy has,
indeed, taken root even in states with the most restrictive former communist regimes. At
the same time, it should be remembered that democratization is a complex multi-faceted
process with public attitudes covering just one its aspect (Dalton & Shin, 2003).
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
The measures utilized in this study to help explore the structure of adolescents’
democratic orientation and describe the context that might shape these attitudes present
several limitations. Because the data at two levels were used, student and country, the
limitations are grouped into two broad categories. The first addresses limitations that
arose when analyzing and interpreting student-level data, while the second deals with
country-levels indicators. In addition, a few general limitations pertaining to both levels
are discussed.
In all analyses, this study utilized cross-sectional data collected from surveys or
created with the help of observations and analyses of various case studies. Although the
cross-sectional data used in this research possess obvious advantages (for example, the
ICCS is the largest comprehensive initiative that collects attitudinal data specifically from
adolescents), there are some limitations associated with the use of such data. One of the
most commonly cited limitations is that cross-sectional data provide a snapshot of a
specific phenomenon or group of phenomena at one specific point in time, thus, making it
difficult to establish any causal relationships (Dixon, 2006).
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In addition, the large sample size of this study might have introduced some bias
with regard to interpretation of statistically significant results. Some of these limitation,
including significance test coefficients for confirmatory factor analyses, were discussed
in detail in Chapter 4. Thus, the sample size should be taken into account when citing the
conclusions drawn from this study.
Some caution that should be exercised when interpreting the results of this study
has to do with the fact that student data are about perceptions rather than observations.
Although self-reported measures have obvious advantages, they nevertheless present
limited opportunities for assessing a number of phenomena objectively (Mascherini,
Vidoni, & Manca, 2011). For example, adolescents might answer questions about
democratic principles in a certain way because they have an understanding of what the
right, or socially accepted, answer should be. In other words, adolescents might give the
answers that they perceive as socially desirable at cost of giving their personal opinions.
Furthermore, trust and self-efficacy variables included in the analysis of
democratic orientation present subjective evaluations of the functioning democracy rather
than normative attitudes toward a general concept of democratic society, such as support
for freedom of expression or citizen participation in political life. For example,
adolescents might view trust in governmental institutions as good for democracy, but
their actual confidence in the government or governmental authorities might not be very
high. Thus, it is possible that this disconnect between adolescents’ perceptions of norms
and their actual evaluations of specific democratic conditions in their societies might
have interfered with the analyses.
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In regard to implications of adolescents’ democratic orientation for their
prospective involvement in political and social activities, another limitation should be
mentioned. Despite the fact that political socialization research has established relative
stability of adolescents’ values and documented their persistence into adult years, the
measured intentions to participate cannot take into account the possibility of future events
or changes in beliefs that might occur between the time of the survey and when
adolescents reach adulthood. Furthermore, the ICCS survey asked adolescents about their
intentions to participate in specific types of political and social activities. Despite some
diversity, the scales that were constructed from these items cannot be considered
comprehensive measures of civic engagement mainly because they capture traditional
forms of participation while ignoring the possibility of other, unconventional, forms of
citizen involvement. In addition, measures of students’ prospective involvement in
various political and social activities should be interpreted with caution because
conclusions that were made with regard to future citizen involvement did not take into
account the effect of many covariates at the student, family, and societal levels.
Next, country-level data used in the study possess additional limitations. First, the
measures of democratic functioning and historical legacies were limited to existing
indicators suggested by previous research. Common criticisms associated with the use of
these measures were discussed earlier, specifically in Chapter 2, in the sections on
Measuring Democratic Citizen Orientation and Historical Legacies.
Additionally, a large part of this study focused on country-level rather than
individual variations in adolescents’ democratic attitudes. Thus potential influence of the
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so called intermediate-level factors, such as community and family effects, were not
accounted for. Additionally, interaction effects between factors of the same levels were
not adequately explored, which might have provided additional insights into the nature of
adolescents’ democratic orientation. However, it should be noted that the ICCS datasets
contain information on a number of contextual characteristics, including school- and
teacher-level data, which might complement the findings obtained from this study.
Overall, these limitations emphasize the complexity of democratic citizen
orientation and point to various influences that should be considered when studying these
complex attitudinal phenomena. In light of these limitations, opportunities for future
studies of democratization and democratic orientation are presented.
As was noted earlier, future investigations of democratic citizen orientation would
benefit from theoretically innovative ways of identifying politically and culturally
relevant aspects of democratic orientation specifically among adolescents. Such
innovative approaches should incorporate insights from traditional theories of democratic
political culture as well as elements from developmental research, sociology and other
disciplines. Moreover, taking into account limitations resulting from the cross-sectional
nature of this research, longitudinal studies could offer new avenues for addressing
existing gaps in the current understanding of democratic citizen orientation and, thus,
should be given priority. Additionally, some might consider the following questions to
guide their research:
-

What factors are related to students’ high scores on each of the three
democratic orientation dimensions?
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-

What individual-level characteristics accompany positive democratic
orientation? What features might hinder the development of such
attitudes? What aspects of students’ background relate to differences in
democratic orientation?

-

What country-level characteristics account for variance in the distribution
of democratic orientation?

-

What are the processes through which adolescents develop commitment to
democratic values?

-

What conditions need to be fostered for youths to develop such
commitments?

-

What changes in citizens’ democratic orientations can feasibly be
expected to take place in post-communist societies in the coming years,
given the current state of democratic orientation among adolescents?
Conclusion

Democratically oriented citizens are important for a healthy development of
modern democracies. In determining the course of democratic developments, younger
generations are traditionally assigned important roles. As this research demonstrated,
democratic citizen orientation is not just an abstract value or ideal commonly cited in
democratization literature, but rather it presents a concrete set of individuals’ attitudes
and behavioral intentions that can be identified and fostered at a relatively early age. A
preliminary investigation of sources and consequences of adolescents’ democratic
orientation offers several conclusions.
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First, although by no means comprehensive, a three-dimensional structure of
democratic orientation provides evidence that adolescents develop a democratic mindset
based on a variety of factors, of which historical legacy and the quality of democratic
institutions appear to have some weight. Secondly, mapping out components of this
mindset helps establish important cross-cultural differences in the patterns of adolescents’
democratic orientations. Furthermore, this dissertation verified the utility of two major
theoretical approaches to studying values and behaviors relevant for democracy – cultural
and institutional. Surprisingly, the legacy of communist regimes appears to have a
positive influence on adolescents’ engagement potential. Finally, the results of the study
suggest that adolescents’ endorsement of democratic values and principles matter for a
country’s long-term democratic outlook.
In sum, this study described the democratic worldview of adolescents from states
with different stages of democratic development by suggesting a three-dimensional
classification of democratic orientation. In doing so, it established that adolescents
display an array of attitudes and behavioral intentions that are reflective of deeper
cultural norms and values as well as of the functioning of current democratic institutions.
These attitudes hold relevance for the study of democracy and practical interventions that
aim to promote a culture of democracy and respect for democratic values. To advance the
current understanding of democratic attitudes among this age group, future research
should identify factors that might be responsible for variation in different aspects of
adolescents’ democratic orientation. From a policy perspective, researchers and policy
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makers should continue to explore strategies for fostering democratic orientation among
adolescents. After all, the seeds of all future democracies exist in today’s adolescents.
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Appendix A: Research Instruments
Support for Democratic Values
There are different views about what a society should be like. We are interested in
your views on this. How much do you agree or disagree with the following
statements?
1. Everyone should always have the right to express their opinions freely.
2. All people should have their social and political rights respected.
3. People should always be free to criticize the government publicly.
4. All citizens should have the right to elect their leaders freely.
5. People should be able to protest if they belief a law is unfair.
Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.
Gender Equality Attitudes
There are different views about the roles of women and men in society. How
much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
1. Men and women should have equal opportunities to take part in
government.
2. Men and women should have the same rights in every way.
3. Women should stay out of politics.
4. When there are not many jobs available, men should more right to a job
than women.
5. Men and women should get equal pay when they are doing the same jobs.
6. Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women.
Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.
Tolerance towards Immigrants
People are increasingly moving from one country to another. How much do you
agree or disagree with the following statements about immigrants?
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1. Immigrants should have the opportunity to continue speaking their own
language.
2. Immigrant children should have the same opportunities for education that
other children in the country have.
3. Immigrants who live in a country for several years should have the
opportunity to vote in elections.
4. Immigrants should have the opportunity to continue their own customs
and lifestyle.
5. Immigrants should have all the same rights that everyone else in the
country has.
Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.
Tolerance towards Ethnic and Racial Minorities
There are different views on the rights and responsibilities of different ethnic/
racial groups in society. How much do you agree with the following statements?
1. All ethnic/ racial groups should have an equal chance to get a good
education in <country of test>.
2. All ethnic/ racial groups should have an equal chance to get good jobs in
<country of test>.
3. Schools should teach students to respect members of al ethnic/ racial
groups.
4. Members of all ethnic/ racial groups should be encouraged to run in
elections for political office.
5. Members of all ethnic/ racial groups should have the same rights and
responsibilities.
Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.
Trust Attitudes
How much do you trust each of the following groups or institutions?
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1. The national government.
2. The local government.
3. Courts of justice.
4. The police.
5. Political parties.
6. National Parliament.
Response categories: completely, quite a lot, a little, not at all.
Attitudes towards One’s Country
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about <country
of test>?
1. The <flag of the country of test> is important to me.
2. The political system in <country of test> works well.
3. I have great respect for <country of test>.
4. In <country of test> we should be proud of what we have achieved.
5. I am proud to live in <country of test>.
6. <Country of test> shows a lot of respect for the environment.
7. Generally speaking, <country of test> is a better country to live in than
most other counties.
Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.
Interest in Political and Social Issues
How much are you interested in the following issues?
1. Political issues within your local community.
2. Political issues in your country.
3. Social issues in your country.
4. Politics in other countries.
5. International politics.
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Response categories: very interested, quite interested, not very interested, not at
all interested.
Internal Political Efficacy
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about you and
politics?
1. I know more about politics than most people my age.
2. When political issues or problems are being discusses, I usually have
something to say.
3. I am able to understand most political issues easily.
4. I have political opinions worth listening to.
5. As an adult I will be able to take part in politics.
6. I have a good understanding of the political issues facing this country.
Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.
Support for Conventional Citizenship
How important are the following behaviors for being a good citizen?
1. Voting in every national election.
2. Joining a political party.
3. Learning about the country’s history.
4. Following political issues in the newspaper, on the radio, on TV or on
the internet.
5. Showing respect for government representatives.
6. Engaging in political discussions.
Response categories: very important, quite important, not very important, not
important at all.
Support for Social-movement Related Citizenship
How important are the following behaviors for being a good citizen?
1. Participating in peaceful protests against laws believed to be unjust.
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2. Participating in activities to benefit people in the local community.
3. Taking part in activities promoting human rights.
4. Taking part in activities to protect the environment.
Response categories: very important, quite important, not very important, not
important at all.
Demographic Variables
1. Are you a boy or a girl?
2. About how many books are there in your home?
Response categories: 0-10 books; 11-25 books, 26-100 books; 101-200 books;
201-500 books; more than 500 books.
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Appendix B: Correlation Coefficients
Variable

1
.

1. Support for democratic
values
2. Support for
conventional citizen
participation
3. Support for socialmovement citizen
participation
4. Interest in social and
political issues
5. Internal political
efficacy
6. Gender equality
attitudes
7. Tolerance toward
ethnic groups
8. Tolerance toward
immigrants
9. Trust attitudes
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.
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.
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6

.01

.
17**

1

.
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.
11**

.
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1

.
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10. Attitudes towards one’s
country
Note: *p<.05 ** p < .01
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Appendix C: Summary of Discriminant Function Analysis
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients
Independent variable

Function
1

2

3

Support for democratic values

-1.14

1.04

-.15

Trust attitudes

-1.02

1.30

.51

Tolerance toward immigrants

-.023

-.12

-.52

Gender equality attitudes

2.16

-.25

-.20

Interest in social and political issues

1.32

-.65

-.76

Internal political efficacy

.42

.06

1.53

Tolerance toward ethnic groups

-.07

-.66

.42

Function at Group Centroids
Type of historical legacy

Function
1

2

3

Established democracy

2.77

.58

.09

Bureaucratic socialism

-3.70

.15

-2.30

Accommodative socialism

-.75

-2.03

.346

Patrimonial socialism

-7.68

1.30

1.18
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